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ABSTRACT 
Tracing is a method that appears within multiple fields of law. 
Distinct conceptions of tracing, however, have arisen independently 
within securities and remedial law.  In the securities context plaintiffs 
must “trace” their securities to a specific offering to pursue certain 
relief under the Securities Act of 1933.  In the remedial context victims 
who “trace” their misappropriated value into a wrongdoer’s hands can 
claim any derivative value, even if it has appreciated. 
This article is the first to compare and then cross-apply tracing 
within these two contexts.  Specifically, this article argues that securities 
law should adopt a version of the “rules-based tracing” method from 
remedial law. This method’s tracing of exchanged value, instead of 
purchased securities, will restore broad access to private civil remedies 
and the optimal level of deterrence for fraudulent public offerings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As part of a broader initiative integrating statutory disclosure 
requirements,1 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
proposed an “access equals delivery” model for prospectuses.2 The 
model would relieve certain issuers of their existing obligations to print 
and deliver a final prospectus to investors prior to or contemporaneous 
with the sale of a security;3 such issuers merely would have to file the 
final prospectus with a timely registration statement.4 This streamlined 
requirement presumes that investors have access to any filings available 
on the internet.5 Accordingly, posting filings on a website would 
constructively effect delivery. 
There are consequences to subsuming delivery obligations within the 
rubric of presumed access.  On the one hand, the “access equals 
delivery” regime would eliminate simultaneous delivery of the final 
 
1 See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. 67392, 67393 & n.15 (proposed 
Nov. 17, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, and 274) 
(“The 1998 proposals [that unsuccessfully attempted to modernize the securities offering 
process] were a step in an evaluation of the offering process under the Securities Act [of 
1933] that began as far back as 1966 . . . .”) (referencing The Regulation of Securities 
Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67174 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998), and citing Milton H. Cohen, 
“Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1342 (1966) (“[I]t is my plea 
that there now be created a new coordinated disclosure system having as its basis the 
continuous disclosure system of the 1934 Act and treating the ‘1933 Act’ disclosure 
needs on this foundation.”)). 
2 See Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67438-41.  The SEC first proposed 
a version of this model in 2000.  See Use of Electronic Media, 17 C.F.R. §§ 231, 241, 
271 (May 4, 2000); see also infra note 5. 
3 These relaxed obligations would be available only to “well-known seasoned 
issuers,” and their majority-owned subsidiaries, that must have at least $700 million of 
outstanding common equity or $1 billion of registered debt securities.  Securities Offering 
Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67396 (A “well-known seasoned issuer” is characterized by 
“having more regular dialogue with investors and market participants through the press 
and other media” as well as its communications being “subject to scrutiny by investors, 
the financial press, and others who evaluate disclosure when it is made.”). 
4 Id. at 67438-39. 
5 Id. at 67438 (“Under an ‘access equals delivery’ model, investors are presumed to 
have access to the Internet . . . . The access concept is premised on the information or 
filings being readily available.”).  One immediate concern with this presumption is that a 
sizable segment of the public still do not have access to the internet.  See, e.g., Spencer 
Overton, The Donor Class:  Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 73, 110 (2004) (“Currently, nearly one-quarter of Americans remain 
‘offline.’”).  Indeed, the SEC cited this lack of access as a reason as recently as 2000 for 
withdrawing an earlier version of “access equals delivery.”  See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, 
Securities Law for the Next Millennium:  A Forward-Looking Statement, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1, 5 n.17 (2001) (“The SEC concluded that such an ‘access-equals-delivery’ model 
was inappropriate at this time because of concerns that electronic media was not 
‘universally accessible and accepted’ by investors.”) (quoting Use of Electronic Media,
Exchange Act Release No. 42727, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
86,304, at 83,388, 83,390 (Apr. 28, 2000)).  This is not to say that such individuals do not 
have internet access through public libraries or institutional investment opportunities that 
do fit the presumption of access.  For a more detailed analysis of this presumption of 
access, see, for example, Anita Indira Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7
J. SMALL & EMERG. BUS. L. 433, 438-54 (2003). 
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prospectus and a confirmation of sale,6 arguably clarifying the function 
of a confirmation and expediting sales of some securities.  On the other 
hand, delivery of the final prospectus after the sale of a security reassures 
investors that their purchase is part of a registered transaction in a way 
that presumed access cannot.7 Recognizing the value of such 
reassurance, the SEC has proposed a rule requiring parties effecting sale 
of a security to send investors a notification, instead of a final prospectus, 
confirming that the transaction is connected to a registration statement.8
Providing reassurance, however, was not the original rationale for 
the proposed notification provision.  In unveiling its “access equals 
delivery” model the SEC announced:  “[T]o preserve an investor’s 
ability to trace securities to a registered offering, the proposals include a 
separate requirement to notify investors that they purchased securities in 
a registered offering.”9 Inexplicably, the SEC’s actual proposal 
completely omits any such concern over the tracing of securities.  This is 
particularly curious considering that the notification provision has 
undergone no apparent revision from its inception.10 
Yet the omission is hardly surprising in that the ability of investors to 
trace securities has been eroding over time.  The Securities Act of 1933 
(Securities Act) strives to protect investors by providing private civil 
remedies that deter fraudulent offerings and sales of securities.11 To 
access these remedies, courts require proof that purchased securities were 
 
6 Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67438 (“Because the contract of sale 
has already occurred, we . . . believe that delivery of a confirmation and the delivery of 
the final prospectus need not be linked.”). 
7 See, e.g., id. at 67349 (“[P]rospectus delivery can serve the function of informing 
investors that they purchased securities in a registered transaction.”). 
8 Id. Investors still would be able to request a final prospectus, but issuers would not 
have to deliver it prior to settlement of the purchase.  Id.; see also infra Part I.B. 
9 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Securities 
Offering Reform, Requires Registration of Hedge Fund Investment Advisers (Oct. 27, 
2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pres/2004-150.htm; see 
also Commission Announcements, SEC News Digest (Oct. 27, 2004) (same), available 
at http://ww.sec.gov/news/digest/dig102704.txt.
10 Despite the comprehensive and significant nature of the SEC’s “access equals 
delivery” proposal, there was no Concept Release. 
11 See, e.g., Edward N. Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The 
Government View, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 6, 9 (1959) (“The two principal objectives of 
the 1933 act were, first, to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate disclosure 
regarding securities distributed to the public in interstate commerce or by use of the mail, 
and, second, to outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities whether or not newly issued.”); 
see also infra note 85 and accompanying text.  This article is concerned only with private 
civil remedies under the Securities Act because they are exclusively subject to the tracing 
requirement.  Some courts and commentators have pointed plaintiffs unable to satisfy the 
tracing requirement to Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act.  See, e.g., Paul C. 
Curnin & Christine M. Ford, The Critical Issue of Standing Under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 155, 156 (2001).  This is a red 
herring.  Rule 10b-5 imposes a stiffer scienter requirement and targets different 
defendants than sections 11 or 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j et 
seq. (2004), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-l et seq. (2004).  Pointing to Rule 10b-5 fails to 
engage the tracing requirement and its thwarting of access to the Securities Act’s private 
civil remedies. 
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issued in connection with an oral communication, prospectus, or 
registration statement containing a material misstatement or omission, 
that is, plaintiffs must “trace” their securities back to a fraudulent public 
offering.12 Courts originally applied this tracing requirement only to 
section 11 of the Securities Act,13 which imposes strict liability on 
offerors and sellers directly involved in a fraudulent registered 
transaction.14 Courts have proceeded to extend the tracing requirement to 
section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act,15 which imposes a negligence 
standard on offerors and sellers that prepare oral communications or 
prospectuses in a fraudulent registered transaction.16 Utilizing an 
aggressive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s heavily criticized 
decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,17 courts subsequently have applied 
the tracing requirement to limit section 12(a)(2)’s recissionary remedy to 
only public offerings.18 As aptly summarized by Hillary Sale, the net 
effect of these judicial interpretations is that the Securities Act’s private 
civil remedies have been “Disappearing Without A Trace.”19 
12 Tracing of securities is alternatively framed as a question of “standing.”  See, e.g.,
Demaria v. Anderson, 318 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Aftermarket purchasers who 
can trace their shares to an allegedly misleading registration statement have standing to 
sue under . . . the 1933 Act.”); Curnin & Ford, supra note 11, at 156 (“[A] plaintiff has 
standing even if his or her shares are purchased in the secondary market within a certain 
number of days after the offering, or are otherwise ‘traceable’ to the offering.”).  This 
conflates distinct terms.  Tracing concerns the factual viability of certain causes of action 
under the Securities Act, whereas standing concerns the procedural propriety of certain 
shareholders bringing a cause of action under the Securities Act.  Accordingly, a plaintiff 
may raise the question of standing at any point in litigation, whereas tracing is a merits 
issue that must await trial.  See, e.g., In re Lilco Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 671 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[T]racing is a question of fact reserved for trial.”).  Certainly standing 
is a threshold requirement in that prospective plaintiffs that lack standing will not be 
subject to the tracing requirement; this perhaps explains why tracing is often collapsed 
into an inquiry about standing.  Plaintiffs with standing, however, still might not be able 
to satisfy the tracing requirement.  See infra notes 232-235 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, reframing tracing as a question of standing invokes a vast body of 
literature fraught with problems of no immediate relevance here.  See, e.g., Nancy C. 
Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613-14 (2004) (“[V]irtually every 
published article on the topic seems to argue that the law of standing is at best confusing 
and at worst a serious impediment to fair and just outcomes.  The doctrine, it is charged, 
is ‘permeated with sophistry,’ a ‘tool to further [judges’] ideological agendas,’ wildly 
vacillating,’ and ‘a large-scale conceptual mistake.”) (quoting 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at 342 (2d ed. 1983)).  As this article 
demonstrates, tracing within securities law is actually a misnomer for a distinct process 
known as “following,” a purely mechanical exercise of locating misappropriated 
property.  See infra Part II.B.  Accordingly, this article does not use the term “standing.” 
13 See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); see also infra Part I.C. 
14 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2004); see also infra Part I.A. 
15 See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); see 
also infra Part I.C. 
16 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004); see also infra Part I.A. 
17 513 U.S. 561 (1995); see also infra note 118. 
18 Regrettably, Congress has codified Gustafson through the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
19 Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without A Trace:  Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 
1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2000). 
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This disappearance is the by-product of securities history and 
practice.  During the late 1960s the system for processing securities 
trades completely collapsed during the “Paper Crunch.”20 In what the 
SEC described as “the most prolonged and severe crisis in the securities 
industry in forty years,”21 brokerage firms had become inundated with 
paper stock certificates that had to be altered, recorded, and then 
physically delivered to issuers for each and every trade.22 Congress 
responded by directing the SEC to implement an electronically-based 
“book-entry system,” which now registers securities in the name of a 
third party nominee, or a “street name.”23 The use of street names has 
erased from securities any vestige that they belong to a specific 
purchaser or come from a particular offering.  Combined with the 
creation of centralized repositories,24 the book-entry system has 
transformed securities into fungible instruments.25 
An unintended casualty of this transformation has been the capacity 
of all securityholders to satisfy the tracing requirement.  Securityholders 
must trace all of their purchases to a specific fraudulent offering.  This is 
because courts consistently have found anything less to be wanting,26 
even a showing that 97% of all securities were from a fraudulent 
offering.27 When there is only one offering of securities, a simple 
inference connects all purchases to any fraud.28 But when there are 
multiple offerings,29 the tracing requirement “draws arbitrary distinctions 
 
20 See infra Part I.B. 
21 STUDY OF SAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS: REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 11(h) OF THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 1970) 1, H.R. Doc. No. 
92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1971) [hereinafter SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND 
PRACTICES].  See also infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
23 See, e.g., Egon Guttman, Toward the Uncertificated Security:  A Congressional 
Lead for States to Follow, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717, 718 (1980) (“Recordation of 
securities in the name of a registered broker/dealer or in that of a national bank or their 
respective nominees is called registration in ‘street name.’”).  See also Prefatory Note,
UCC Rev. Art. 8, at 4 (2000) (“[O]ne entity-Cede & Co.-is listed as the shareholder of 
record of somewhere in the range of sixty to eighty percent of the outstanding shares of 
all publicly traded companies.”). 
24 The Depository Trust Company (DTC) is the nation’s largest repository for 
publicly traded securities.  See, e.g., Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 4 (“Essentially all 
of the trading in publicly held companies is executed through the broker-dealers who are 
participants in DTC . . . .”).  See also infra notes 103, 108, and accompanying text. 
25 See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
26 See, e.g., Krim v. pcOrder.com, 210 F.R.D. 581, 586 (W.D. Tex. 2002) 
(“[D]amages [must] actually [be] issued pursuant to a defective statement, not just that it 
might have been, probably was, or most likely was, issued pursuant to a defective 
statement.”). 
27 See In re Quarterdeck Office Sys. Sec. Litig., No. CV 92-3970, 1993 WL 623310, 
at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993). 
28 In re:  Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 3857, 01 Civ. 
8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004). 
29 This includes shelf-registered securities, although there is arguably a decreased 
need to protect participants in such offerings.  See, e.g., Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory 
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between plaintiffs based on the remote genesis of their shares.”30 Only 
parties that purchase securities before they flow through the book-entry 
system have any assurance of tracing successfully; this is a “narrow class 
of persons,”31 which includes “institutional investors, members of 
Congress, and those with connections to underwriters.”32 Everyone else 
who purchases securities in the aftermarket must try to trace fungible 
securities registered in street name back to a specific fraudulent 
offering.33 As one court has conceded: 
The modern practice of electronic delivery and clearing 
of securities trades, which all deposited shares of the 
same issue are held together in fungible bulk, makes it 
virtually impossible to trace shares to a registration 
statement once additional unregistered shares have 
entered the market.34 
Indeed, a commentator recently found only five instances where 
securityholders were even “possibly able to meet the direct-tracing 
requirement.”35 
The reason is that tracing creates a perverse incentive to conduct 
multiple offerings.  Provided only one of the offerings does not involve 
fraud, aftermarket purchasers have little, if any, chance of tracing 
fungible securities successfully.  In this way conducting multiple 
offerings can utilize the tracing requirement to evade or undo liability 
under sections 11 or 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.  As Melvyn Weiss, a 
prominent shareholder advocate, “bitterly” has accused one court: 
Weiss:  “[Y]ou are giving them an incentive to avoid 
section 11 liability.” 
 
Court:  “What do I do about the case law, which 
according to the defense, whether it’s one percent or less 
than one percent [of non-fraudulent securities], once that 
problem occurs, the cases, they . . . uniformly say it’s 
over.”36 
The court proceeded to say just that, finding the securities untraceable 
while discreetly noting that “it is not the domain of this Court to 
 
Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration:  An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 135, 176-84 (1984). 
30 In re:  IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *37. 
31 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951); see also 
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967). 
32 Sale, supra note 19, at 441.  This class includes persons fortunate enough to 
receive “spun” stock.  See generally Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing:  A 
Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public 
Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583 (2004); Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO--
Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023 (2002).  
See also infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text. 
34 In re:  IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38 (emphasis added). 
35 Sale, supra note 19, at 463. 
36 In re:  IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38 n.402.  The court more tactfully observed 
that Weiss had “noted bitterly the possible unfairness of this standard.”  Id. 
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abrogate” the tracing requirement.37 The intent of Congress, however, 
could not be any clearer:  to deter fraudulent offerings through the 
Securities Act’s private civil remedies.38 This is where the true 
abrogation has occurred.  By strictly applying the tracing requirement, 
courts have thwarted equal and meaningful access to sections 11 and 
12(a)(2), and undermined their deterrence effect. 
Ironically, the tracing requirement is unsatisfactory regardless of 
one’s view towards these provisions.  Scholars that favor expanded 
access to private civil remedies have observed that “[w]hat began . . . as 
a shield to prevent non-Offering Shareholders from proceeding with 
section 11 claims has become a sword in the hands of defendants . . . .”39 
Yet practitioners that support restricted access to these remedies have 
contended that the “confusion and uncertainty engendered by a broad 
interpretation of ‘tracing’ is an anathema to a coherent and predictable 
federal securities regulatory scheme.”40 
Securities law, however, misunderstands what remedial law already 
knows.  Tracing originated as a remedial method.41 Though its definition 
is far from settled,42 tracing refers to a process of determining when, “for 
certain legal purposes, one asset stands in the place of another.”43 
Tracing in this context enables a victim to seek a claim forcing a 
wrongdoer to disgorge all proceeds derived from misappropriated 
value;44 tracing thus embodies the ancient maxim omnia praesumuntur 
contract apoliatorem, or everything is presumed against a thief.45 In the 
parlance of criminal procedure tracing regards the wrongdoer’s value as 
ill-gotten fruit from a poisonous tree. 
The justification for remedial tracing lies at the core of restitution.  In 
a conventional sense restitution provides relief from unjust enrichment, 
when a party has received a legally unjustifiable benefit at another 
party’s expense.46 There is also a literal sense known as “specific 
 
37 Id. 
38 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
39 Sale, supra note 19, at 463-64. 
40 Curnin & Ford, supra note 11, at 203. 
41 See infra Part II.A. 
42 See infra Parts II.A-B. 
43 LIONEL D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 3 (1997).  Dale Oesterle defines tracing 
conventionally as a “restitutionary right to claim specific property . . . that arises from a 
property interest of the claimant in other property that another has misappropriated.”  
Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated 
Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172, 173 (1983).  This 
definition is premised on certain distinctions that are rebutted by or subsumed within the 
notion of rules-based tracing that I use here, see infra Part II.B., and that is a form of 
corrective justice, see generally Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of 
Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138 (1999); Lionel Smith, Restitution:  The Heart 
of Corrective Justice, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2115 (2001). 
44 Remedial tracing typically focuses on assets or property, in the way courts focus 
on tracing securities.  I embrace a conception of tracing that instead focuses on value, a 
more principled basis for establishing legal claims.  See infra Parts II.B. & III.A. 
45 PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 368 (1989). 
46 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 1, at 12 (1937) (“A person who has been unjustly enriched at 
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restitution,” which involves “restoration in something lost or taken 
away.”47 These dual senses of restitution are captured in a theory known 
as “rules-based tracing,”48 which draws a parallel distinction between 
tracing and “following.”  The latter is an exercise that attempts to 
identify and locate only the value of what has been misappropriated 
from a party;49 although the exercise is exclusively factual, and so does 
not generate any legal liability, successful following enables a party to 
seek a specific restitution claim.  In contrast tracing is a process that 
attempts to determine whether certain value a wrongdoer possesses is a 
substitute for original value misappropriated from a party;50 although the 
process also does not generate any legal liability, successful tracing 
enables a party to seek an unjust enrichment claim.  In this way tracing 
represents a powerful tool to impose on the wrongdoer the costs of 
misappropriation, and reallocate its benefits to the victim ex post. Dale 
Oesterle has observed that “the primary limitation on the scope of the 
right to trace is the ignorance of lawyers as to its availability.”51 
Securities law suffers from not only an ignorance, but also an 
impoverished conception, of tracing proper.  At best, the current tracing 
requirement is simply a form of rules-based following.52 Courts 
predicate access to private civil relief under the Securities Act upon a 
showing that plaintiffs can identify and locate their purchased security 
within a specific fraudulent offering.  But while the security is the object 
of this exercise, this is not what the Securities Act’s remedial provisions 
actually restore, which is monetary relief.53 The current tracing 
requirement, then, is not even a form of specific restitution.  Nor is the 
requirement a form of unjust enrichment.  Requiring securityholders to 
demonstrate a link between their purchase and a specific fraudulent 
offering involves no component of inequitable gain or loss, much less 
any disgorgement of substituted value.  On the contrary, most 
securityholders cannot satisfy the current tracing requirement precisely 
because their purchase is commingled with other like securities 
registered in street name from multiple offerings.54 Securities law, 
therefore, applies a conception of tracing that ironically frustrates, rather 
than relieves, victims of fraudulent offerings. 
 
the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.”) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION]; id. at 1 (“The Restatement of this Subject deals with 
situations in which one person is accountable to another on the ground that otherwise he 
would unjustly benefit or the other would unjustly suffer loss.”) (General Scope Note). 
47 Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1277, 1279 (1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 372 
(1981) (providing for specific restitution at law and in equity) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
OF CONTRACTS]; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 4, cmt. c (providing for 
specific restitution at law); infra Part II.A. 
48 See infra Part II.B. 
49 See infra notes 182, 186, and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text. 
51 Oesterle, supra note 43, at 180. 
52 See infra Part III.A. 
53 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77l(2) (2004). 
54 See infra Part III.B. 
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This article proposes a novel way to reconceptualize tracing of 
securities culled from its remedial relative, rules-based tracing.  Part I 
examines tracing within securities law.  Specifically, Part I demonstrates 
how the book-entry system has combined with the judicially-created 
tracing requirement to restrict access to private civil remedies under the 
Securities Act and undermine its ability to deter fraud.  Part II shifts to 
tracing within remedial law.  Specifically, Part II analyzes inadequacies 
with various approaches to tracing assets and property, and delineates 
how rules-based tracing’s focus on value can resolve the problems 
presented by commingled fungible assets.  Part III then reconciles 
securities and remedial tracing.  The critical move is to reorient securities 
law towards substituted value, the money exchanged for securities.55 
This method of tracing can solve the problems presented by multiple 
offerings with the aid of a simple designation system.  At the point of 
purchase securityholders need only select an offering that will be used 
for making claims under section 11 or 12(a)(2).  Permitting these 
selections is consistent with the Securities Act’s antifraud provisions and 
with the recently proposed “access equals disclosure” model.  Most 
importantly, by tracing money instead of securities, courts can restore all 
securityholders’ access to private civil remedies and optimal deterrence 
against fraudulent offerings.   
 
METHODOLOGY 
This article is an application of “intradisciplinarity,”56 a method that 
“transfers theories, practices, and technologies across legal domains.”57 
Intradisciplinarity recognizes that the law is conventionally organized 
around certain categorical distinctions, such as the theoretical divide 
between the private and public,58 or the curricular compartmentalizing of 
civil procedure, contracts, criminal law, property, and torts.59 A by-
product of these distinctions is that legal doctrines can arise in different 
domains of the law and develop in dissimilar or inconsistent ways. 
 
55 Cf. ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Bros. 1976) (“I have to do this my way.  
You tell me what you know, and I’ll confirm.  I’ll keep you in the right direction if I can, 
but that’s all.  Just . . . follow the money.”) (Hal Holbrook aka Deep Throat). 
56 Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholders and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 
152 (2003). 
57 Id. Anupam Chander perspicuously observes that “intradisciplinarity seems 
especially appropriate to law, a discipline that relies on analogical reasoning.”  Id. I
agree with his implicit point that intradisciplinarity is neither necessarily nor advisedly 
restricted to law. 
58 See, e.g., Symposium, Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 
(1982); Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American 
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225 (1985). 
59 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Path Not Taken, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1044, 1045 
(1997) (noting, “in reciprocal disdain, torts courses ignore the policy objectives of 
adjacent fields like contracts, civil procedure, criminal law, and property,” a “path of 
increasing social irrelevance and irresponsibility” that departs from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s prescription of the “rational study of law”). 
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Intradisciplinarity critically examines these dissimilarities and 
inconsistencies.  The method juxtaposes and compares concurrent 
conceptions of a legal doctrine or method, eliciting structural and 
substantive parallels.  These parallels then serve as a basis for cross-
fertilization, utilizing one domain’s conception to inform our 
understanding and application of another.  In this way intradisciplinarity 
facilitates dialogue between legal domains, and thereby challenges the 
artificiality of certain categorical barriers within the law. 
Intradisciplinarity has a distinguished lineage.60 The method has 
connected seemingly disparate domains such as contract and tort law,61 
tort and criminal law,62 criminal and corporate law,63 as well as corporate 
and evidentiary law.64 And a recent movement revitalizing the method 
appears to be afoot in corporate circles.65 Cynics might dismiss the 
 
60 Within legal discourse the method can be traced back to Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:  One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), which furnished a principled way to integrate 
property and tort law.  Commentators have extended the method to areas such as criminal 
and contract law.  See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.  And intradisciplinarity 
is naturally suited for quasi-meta-subjects, such as constitutional, intellectual property, 
and international law, that encompass a broad range of legal fields.  See, e.g., BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. 
Paredes, The Basics Matter:  At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 174 (2004) (distilling principles of antitrust, contract, and property law within the 
framework of intellectual property law); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law 
and International Relations Theory:  A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 372 (1998) (observing a “lively intradisciplinary debate” within 
international law about the relationship between comparative politics and constitutional 
law).  I see no reason why intradisciplinarity cannot be extended to meta-subjects, such as 
civil and criminal procedure, conflicts of law, evidence, and, obviously, remedies.  See, 
e.g., David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving 
Home:  What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO.
L.J. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=706601.
61 See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1980) 
(connecting compensation systems within criminal, insurance, labor, and tort law); 
GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (1976) (arguing that contracts law is being 
reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort law).  But see, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell, The 
Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1977) 
(suggesting a way to segregate problems associated with characterizing problems as one 
of contract or torts). 
62 See, e.g., Symposium, The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. 
REV. 1 (1996).  See also Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort:  Old Wine in New Bottles,
in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231 
(Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977). 
63 See, e.g., LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND 
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information:  
Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992); 
Arthur L. Goodhard, Blackmail and Consideration in Contracts, 44 L.Q. REV. 436 
(1928). 
64 See, e.g., Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735 (2004) (reconciling 
corporate and evidentiary gatekeeping). 
65 See generally Chander, supra note 56 (reconciling the notion of “minorities” 
within constitutional and corporate law); Stephen Choi & Jill Fisch, How to Fix Wall 
Street:  A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 
(2003) (grafting the notion of vouchers from school and campaign finance schemes to 
certain private intermediaries); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of 
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method as a simple pursuit of consistent approaches among legal 
domains.66 With all due respect to Ralph Waldo Emerson,67 this article 
endeavors to demonstrate that intradisciplinarity is not foolishly 
concerned with its own shadow, but instead has much to do with tracing 
in particular and corporate law in general. 
 
I. TRACING SECURITIES 
The express purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors.  In 
this vein sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act provide private 
civil remedies for material misstatements or omissions in connection 
with a public offering of securities.  Access to these remedies, however, 
was compromised by the infamous Paper Crunch of the late 1960s, in 
which the system for processing securities trades first collapsed and then 
overhauled itself; the resulting book-entry system created a centralized 
system where fungible securities are now registered in the name of a 
third party intermediary, and not the actual purchaser. 
Severing this link between purchasers and securities has 
inadvertently transformed the judicially-created tracing requirement.  
Courts require plaintiffs seeking relief under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of 
the Securities to prove that their purchased securities actually were part 
of a fraudulent public offering.  Tracing securities is thus an evidentiary 
standard, requiring securityholders to prove factual causation between 
the alleged fraud in a specific offering and a purchase of securities. 
Not all securityholders are alike, however, in the eyes of securities 
tracing.  When there are multiple offerings, courts apply a conception of 
tracing that can be satisfied by only a select group of purchasers with 
 
Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267 (2004) 
drawing parallels between Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001 as a response to recent financial 
scandals, and USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, as a response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001); Thomas W. Joo, Race, Contract, Property, and the Role of 
Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779 (2002) (examining within 
corporate law the contractarian metaphor, based on consent and enforceability, and the 
property metaphor, based on rights and duties); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate 
Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565 (2003) (comparing corporate and 
trust instruments in relation to capital markets). 
66 This objection is formally expressed by the Fallacy of the Transplanted Category.  
See Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REV. 535, 547 
(1959) (“When a legal category . . . is imported into a different context where a different 
legal result (involving different legal policies) is in issue, the transplanted category may 
well suggest a result which frustrates the relevant policies which should control the 
determination of the new issue.”).  Cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1058 (1996) (examining the problem of structural inconsistency, 
“[t]he theoretical antithesis of . . . the so-called fallacy of the transplanted category”). 
67 See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 66 
(C.W. Eliot ed., 1909) (“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by 
little statesmen and philosophers and divines.  With consistency a great soul has simply 
nothing to do.  He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall.”).  But cf. 
Christoph Engel, Inconsistency in the Law:  In Search of a Balanced Norm (Dec. 2004) 
(contending that consistency in legal rules has limited consequential value), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=628387.
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direct access to a fraudulent offering.  Because of the book-entry system, 
aftermarket purchasers receive fungible securities registered in street 
name, and cannot trace them reliably back to a specific offering.  As a 
result, the judicial tracing requirement currently operates to eviscerate 
private civil remedies for a broad set of securityholders, and thereby 
undercut the Securities Act’s ability to deter fraudulent public offerings. 
This Part establishes the troubled application of tracing within the 
securities context.  Opponents and proponents of securities tracing both 
ground their arguments in the Securities Act’ intent and provisions.  
Accordingly, the first step is to examine the statutory relief afforded by 
sections 11 and 12(a)(2).  This statutory background provides a reference 
point by which to contrast the realities of the book-entry system.  The 
second step is to understand that system’s mechanics in relation to the 
old system responsible for the Paper Crunch.  Establishing the gap 
between these statutory remedies and practical procedures for offered 
securities creates a context for understanding this conception of tracing.  
This in turn sets up the remedial, and ultimately the intradisciplinary, 
conception of tracing. 
 
A. The Securities Act of 1933 
In the shadow of the “Black Days,”68 and the ensuing Great 
Depression, Congress enacted the Securities Act.69 Otherwise known as 
the “Truth in Securities” Act,70 this “remarkable piece of legislation”71 
68 See, e.g., Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 n.97 (1990) (“[T]here was hardly an American 
who was not aware of its occurrence and who did not date hard times from, and associate 
his distress with, the black days of October 1929”) (citing DAVID SAUL LEVIN,
REGULATING THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 59 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University)). 
69 15 U.S.C. § 77k et seq. (2003); see also Gadsby, supra note 11, at 9 (“The 
Securities Act of 1933 . . . became effective on July 7, 1933, a date roughly 
corresponding to the low point in the stock market and in our general economy.”); James 
M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
29, 30 (1959) (“The [Securities] [A]ct naturally had its beginnings in the high financing 
of the Twenties that was followed by the market crash of 1929.”).  This is not to suggest 
that Black Monday caused the Great Depression or that either event singularly prompted 
Congress to adopt the Securities Act.  See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF WALL STREET--A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 33, 39 (1982) (“[M]uch more than the depression or the preceding 
market crash, it was the Pecora hearings [examining banking institutions and 
personalities] that influenced the character of the 1933 Securities Act and of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission later created to enforce it.”); see also Bevis 
Longstreth, The SEC After Fifty Years:  An Assessment of Its Past and Future, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (1983) (“[T]he picture that emerges [from Seligman’s 
account] is one of considerate controversy and political horse trading.”).  According to 
the Securities Act’s legislative history, “[t]he general belief among legislators was that 
many underwriters and dealers in securities had not been operating in a fair, honest, and 
prudent manner.”  Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment:  A 
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of 1934, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 334-35 (1988). 
70 See, e.g., William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171 (1933) (“All the [Securities] Act pretends to do is to require 
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has the express purpose of “provid[ing] full and fair disclosure of the 
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and 
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof . . . .”72 
According to then-President Franklin Roosevelt, the Securities Act “adds 
to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine ‘let the seller 
also beware.’  It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the 
seller.”73 Specifically, through registration requirements, the Securities 
Act strives to provide investors with adequate disclosures and thereby 
guard against fraudulent offers and sales of all securities.74 
The Securities Act provides two private civil remedies for fraud 
connected with an offer of securities.75 Section 11 imposes strict liability 
on persons directly76 involved in an offering whose registration statement 
 
the ‘truth about securities’ at the time of issue, and to impose a penalty for failure to tell 
the truth.  Once it is told, the matter is left to the investor.”). 
71 Cohen, supra note 1, at 1344; but cf. Adolph A. Berle, High Finance:  Master or 
Servant, 23 YALE REV. 20, 42 (1933) (describing the Securities Act as “spectacular,” and 
yet also “salutary,” in its failure “to solve the problem of who is entitled to the increment 
of value arising from organization, or the increment of power arising from control”); 
Amy L. Goodman, It’s Past Time To Rethink the Securities Act of 1933, 14 INSIGHTS 2, 2 
(2000) (“[B]efore the registration statement is filed, no ‘offers to sell may be made’ and 
prior to the SEC declaring the registration statement to be effective (the waiting period), 
no written offers may be made.  The end result is that in many ways the Securities Act is 
an antidisclosure statute.”). 
72 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2004); see also S. REP. NO. 47, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1933), 
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 17, at 1 (comp. by Jack S. Ellenberg & Ellen P. Mahar 
1973) (“The basic policy is that of informing the investors of the facts concerning 
securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing 
protection against fraud and misrepresentation.”) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].  
The Securities Act further provides that the SEC, whenever “required to determine 
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,” “shall also consider, 
in addition to the protection of investors, whether action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”  15 U.S.C. § 77b(b). 
73 H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 72, item 18, at 2 (Statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt); see 
also Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 49, at 338 (“The aim [of President Roosevelt’s call 
for federal securities legislation] was to be ‘full publicity and information, and that no 
essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying 
public.’”). 
74 See, e.g., Gadsby, supra note 11, at 9 (“The two principal objectives of the 1933 
act were, first, to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate disclosure 
regarding securities distributed to the public in interstate commerce or by use of the mail, 
and, second, to outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities whether or not newly issued.”); 
Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for 
Fraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 871 
(1991) (“Adoption of the 1933 Act served a two-fold purpose.  First, Congress intended 
to provide prospective investors with full disclosure through the section 5 registration 
obligation. . . . Second, Congress intended to outlaw fraud in connection with the offer 
and sale of any security, whether registered or unregistered.”). 
75 This article does not address remedies under sections 15 and 17(a) of the 
Securities Act as they are not subject to the tracing requirement. 
76 Five classes of defendants can be held liable under section 11:  (1) the issuer; (2) 
its current directors or partners; (3) its future directors or partners who have consented to 
being named in the registration statement; (4) experts who have consented to being 
named as having prepared or certified the registration statement; and (5) underwriters.  
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misstates or omits material facts.77 As reliance is generally presumed,78 a 
prima facie case requires only proof of a material misstatement or 
omission.79 In comparison section 12(a)(2) imposes essentially a 
 
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5) (2004).  There have been unsuccessful attempts to attach 
section 11 liability to a sixth class of defendants, institutional investors.  See, e.g.,
Jennifer O’Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability 
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 217, 222 (“The 
argument that institutional investors are subject to liability under Section 11 has so far 
been rejected by the courts.”) (citing cases).  For the issuer, liability “is virtually absolute, 
even for innocent misstatements.”  Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
382 (1982).  For other classes of defendants, there is a due diligence defense.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2004). 
77 Section 11 relevantly provides: 
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became 
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted 
to state a material fact required to be stated therein not misleading, 
any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time 
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either 
at law or in equity, sue . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2004); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11:  
Public Offering Liability in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45, 45 (2000) (“[S]trict liability . . . and the failure of ‘due diligence’ liability . . . 
[have made] Section 11 the ‘bête noire,’ in Louis Loss’s words, of the legislative 
scheme.”) (quoting LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4246 (3d ed. 
1991)). 
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2004).  Reliance is presumed for one year after the post-
effective date.  Id. Of course, this is a variation of the “fraud on the market” theory first 
established in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988), and its underlying 
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), seminally formulated in Eugene Fama, 
Efficient Capital Markets:  A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 
(1970), and famously applied to law in Reinier H. Kraakman & Ronald J. Gilson, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).  Among the more serious 
challenges to the EMCH have come from legal decision theory, otherwise known as 
behavioral law and economics.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later:  The Hindsight Bias (Oct. 2003) 
(incorporating insights from legal decision theory into their MOME thesis), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=462786; Lynn Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency:  
An Introduction to the New Finance (Dec. 2003) (exploring financial literature on asset 
pricing, arbitrage, and behavioral phenomena that suggests alternative ways to analyze 
market behavior), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=470161.
There are, however, extensive concerns about legal decision theory and its critique 
of the EMCH.  For instance, Greg Mitchell has argued that: 
[A] great deal of psychological research . . . brings into question the 
claims of the legal decision theorists regarding the fallibility of 
judgment and decision making in experimental settings and qualifies 
the generalizations that can be safely drawn from this research. 
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?  The Unwarranted Pessimism of 
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1936 (2002); see 
also Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 59, 80 (2003) (“I suspect that the end result [of the behavioral theory influx] will 
not be an abandonment of the belief of many in the profession that the stock market is 
remarkably efficient in its utilization of information.”).  But cf., e.g., Jeffrey L. 
Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology:  A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious 
Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000). 
79 Section 11 limits total liability to the aggregate offering price.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
77k(g) (2004).  Section 11 damages are calculated by a complex formula that subtracts 
from the purchase price of a security (a) its sale price, if sold prior to the lawsuit, or (b) 
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negligence standard upon offerors or sellers80 of securities that sign or 
prepare prospectuses or oral communications in connection with an 
offering of securities.81 Although reliance is also presumed,82 a prima 
facie case under section 12(a)(2) requires a three-fold showing:  (1) the 
prospectus or oral communication misstates or omits a material fact, (2) 
the registered securityholder must not have known of the fraud at the 
time of purchase, and (3) privity exists between the registered security 
and the seller defendant.83 Moreover, unlike their section 11 
counterparts, section 12(a)(2) defendants have a defense that they did not 
and reasonably could not know of the material misstatement or 
omission.84 Both of these private civil remedies, however, represent a 
 
its “true” value at the time the lawsuit commences, if retained throughout the lawsuit.  
See id. at § 77k(e).  If a section 11 plaintiff sells the relevant security after commencing 
the lawsuit, but before judgment, courts will deduct the sales price only if it is less than 
the true value; accordingly, “[t]he formula set forth in section 11(e) presents the plaintiff 
who has not yet sold his or her securities with a strategic decision:  whether or not to 
sell.”  1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.5[2], at 368 (2d ed. 
1990).  If a section 11 plaintiff retains the relevant security throughout the lawsuit, 
subsequent price increases or decreases are irrelevant.  See, e.g., Sale, supra note 19, at 
437 (“This formula provides the shareholders who do not sell before suit with a potential 
windfall if their securities appreciate after the filing date, but offers no protection if the 
price declines after the judgment.”). 
80 The level of active participation necessary to qualify a party as a “seller” under 
section 12(a)(2) is a contentious subject.  See, e.g., Joseph E. Reece, Would Someone 
Please Tell Me the Definition of the Term ‘Seller’:  The Confusion Surrounding Section 
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35 (1989) (recommending 
consistency as between the definitions of “seller” in sections 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(2)).  Due 
to the privity requirement, there is only class of section 12(a)(2) defendants.  See infra 
note 83. 
81 Section 12(a)(2) relevantly provides: 
Any person who . . . offers or sells a security . . . by means of a 
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not 
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, 
shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such security from him, 
who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent 
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004); cf. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, at 982 (opining that “it is 
best not to attempt a paraphrase” of section 12(a)(2) as it is “not too happily drafted”). 
82 See, e.g., Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 
1991); Smole v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1990); Sanders v. 
John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 619, F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 
609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980); Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs, & Co., 560 
F.2d 916, 923 (8th Cir. 1977). 
83 See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004).  Section 12(a)(2) damages are based on the 
purchase price of the security, if sold prior to the lawsuit, or limited to rescission of the 
purchase of the security, if retained throughout the lawsuit.  See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 77, at 983 (“Rescission and § 12(2) are substantially the same in that both 
require the buyer to prove a ‘misrepresentation’ of fact.’”). 
84 See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004).  See also generally Therese H. Maynard, The 
Affirmative Defense of Reasonable Care Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 
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deterrence-based approach to preventing fraudulent offerings of 
securities.85 
B. The Book-Entry System 
 
Three decades after the enactment of the Securities Act, brokers and 
dealers found themselves in the “Paper Crunch.”86 By the late 1960’s, 
the daily trading volume had increased to approximately thirteen million 
within a system designed to process only three million.87 As a result, 
The back offices of many a broker-dealer resembled a 
trackless forest. . . . Stock certificates and related 
documents were piled “halfway to the ceiling” in some 
offices; clerical personnel were working overtime, six 
and seven days a week, with some firms using a second 
or even a third shift to process each day’s transaction.  
Hours of trading on the exchange and over the counter 
 
1933, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1993).  This “reasonable care” standard is different 
than section 11’s “due diligence” language.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) with 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77l(2). 
85 See, e.g., Concerning Litigation Under TI-IF, Federal Securities laws, Before the 
House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. On Energy and 
Commerce, Fed. News Serv. (July 22, 1994) (referencing “the importance of private 
actions under the federal securities law” to provide “deterrence against securities law 
violations”) (Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n).  See 
also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 613 (1985) (“True, people sometimes say that the function of 
securities law is ‘the protection of investors’ or ‘compensation for wrongs,’ but these are 
just restatements of the objective of efficient operation of the markets.”); Theresa A. 
Gabaldon, Causation, Courts, and Congress:  A Study of Contradiction in the Federal 
Securities Laws, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1060 (1990) (“[D]eterrence is the logical, and 
acknowledged, congressional goal; its method of accomplishment is imposition of a 
penalty that sometimes theoretically will equal but sometimes will exceed the defendant’s 
gain from any misrepresentation.”).  Cf. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors:  A 
Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 
VA. L. REV. 925, 945 (1999) (“Deterrence plays an important role in reducing [the 
principal social costs produced by fraud on the market].  Compensation, by contrast, does 
little reduce the costs of fraud on the market.”). 
86 SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 28. 
87 Id. As a reference point, on January 2, 1934, only 1.27 million shares were traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange.  NYSE Statistics Archive, available at 
http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/p1020656068262.html?displayPage=%2Fmarketinfo%
2F1022221393893.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).  The increase in trading volume that 
induced the Paper Crunch is attributable to the rise of over-the-counter markets and large 
financial institutions.  See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal:  A Cueing Theory of 
Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 274 (2004) (“Over-the-counter . . . 
began to acquire substantial and growing market share.  By the late 1950s, large financial 
institutions were actively trading large blocks of equity securities.  Over the next decade, 
this trend would produce a quadrupling of equity share volume.”).  “Today, the system 
can easily handle trading volume on routine days of hundreds of millions of shares.”  
Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 4.  The all-time record for shares traded in one day on 
the New York Stock Exchange is 2.81 billion shares on July 24, 2002.  NYSE Statistics 
Archive, available at http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/p1020656068262.html?display
Page=%2Fmarketinfo%2F1022221393893.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
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were curtailed to give back offices additional time after 
the closing bell.88 
For instance, from June 12 to December 31, 1968, the New York Stock 
Exchange suspended all trading on Wednesdays to allow brokerage firms 
time to process trades.89 By late 1969 stock prices began to decline, and 
a concomitant reduction in trading volume contributed to the liquidation 
of over 160 brokerage firms, impacting thousands of their customers.90 
According to Joel Seligman, the Paper Crunch “was the most serious 
failure of securities industry self-regulation in the Commission’s 
history,” a complete “collapse of industry regulatory controls . . . .”91 
The object of ensuing reform efforts was the very system for 
processing securities.  Until 1970 clearing and settlement of trades 
involved the physical movement of paper stock certificates.92 These 
unique certificates, issued by a corporation, evidenced their holder’s 
ownership and its accompanying rights.93 To effect a trade, brokers and 
dealers wrote the transferee’s name on the back of the certificate and 
then delivered the actual certificate to the issuer, who then recorded on 
its books the change in ownership.94 Even in light of the technological 
 
88 SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 13; see also Clearance 
and Settlement of Securities Transactions:  Hearings on S.3412, S.3297 and S.2551 
Before the Subcomm. On Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96 (1972) (reporting that, in December, 1968, 
member firms of the New York Stock Exchange had failed to deliver $4.4. billion and to 
receive $4.7 million in securities to brokers or dealers within the customary five business 
day settlement period) (Statement of William J. Carey, Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission).  But cf. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This 
Time?, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291, 312 n.42 (contending drafters of 1997 
amendments to Article 8 of the UCC “thought that the ‘paper crunch’ was a problem of 
too many pieces of paper” and “did not consider that the colloquial phrase ‘paper work’ 
is shorthand for any form of clerical work, regardless of the presence or absence of 
physical pieces of paper.”). 
89 Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 8 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 562 n.13 (1990). 
90 See, e.g., SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 14; S. REP.
NO. 92-1009, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1971); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1519, at 9-10 (1972). 
91 SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 450. 
92 See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability:  A New Model for Transfers 
and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
307, 316-17 (1990) (defining “clearing” as “the process whereby the trades are compared, 
matched, and confirmed” and “settling” as “the process whereby parties to trades fulfill 
their obligations thereunder-generally a ‘delivery’ of the securities by the seller and 
payment of the agreed price by the buyer”). 
93 See, e.g., Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 2-3 (“Ownership of securities was 
traditionally evidenced by possession of the certificates . . . .”).  Some states, however, do 
not require corporations to issue stock certificates to shareholders.  See, e.g., Cal. Corp. 
Code § 12401(a) (2003).  See also REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.26(a) (3d ed. 2004) 
(“Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, the board of directors 
of a corporation may authorize the issue of some or all of the shares of any or all of its 
classes or series without certificates.”). 
94 See, e.g., Suellen M. Wolfe, Escheat and the Concept of Apportionment:  A Bright 
Line Test to Slice a Shadow, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173 (1995) (“Prior to 1970 . . . [t]he owner 
would endorse the physical certificate to the name of the assignee on the back of the 
certificate . . . . If the parties used the services of a broker, the seller would transfer the 
certificate to his brokerage firm.”). 
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limitations at that time,95 the process was expensive in its consumption of 
time and susceptibility to error.96 
Congress responded by enacting the Securities Investor Protection 
Act of 1970 (SIPA).97 Specifically, SIPA directed the SEC to “facilitate 
the establishment of a national system for the prompt and accurate 
clearance and settlement of transactions in securities.”98 By the end of 
1971 the SEC reported the creation of a “nationwide net-by-net clearance 
and settlement system for over the counter securities which promises to 
minimize substantially the handling of certificates and speed up the 
entire transaction process with regard to those securities for the bulk of 
the certificate handling problems.”99 This in turn lead to the eventual 
introduction of a national book-entry system.100 
As with its accounting counterpart,101 the book-entry system involves 
a combination of physical and non-physical securities.102 Corporations 
 
95 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of 
Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985). 
96 See, e.g., Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 3 (“Transfer of securities in the 
traditional certificate-based system was a complicated, labor-intensive process.”).  
According to the SEC’s assessment of the Paper Crunch, “the primary cause of the 
industry’s problems was its inability to accurately, promptly and inexpensively record 
and process the substantially increased trading volume of the late 1960’s.”  SEC, UNSAFE 
AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 28; see also Guttman, supra note 23, at 718 
n.8 (citing causes of failure for 64 securities firms liquidated under SIPA, with “poor 
books and records” being the most prevalent reason in 44 cases). 
97 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78lll (2004).  According to Thomas Joo, 
although SIPA was designed to protect broker-dealers by promoting 
investor confidence, the loss of investor confidence was not the cause 
of the failures that inspired SIPA.  Rather, the reverse was the case:  
Congress feared the failures attributed to the back office crisis were 
causing a loss of confidence. 
Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers?  The Securities Investor Protection Act, 
Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1082 
(1999). 
98 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a)(2) (1976); see also In re Nat’l Sec. Clearing Corp. for 
Registration as a Clearing Agency, SEC Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-13,163 (Jan. 13, 
1977), codified at 42 Fed. Reg. 396 (delineating, in response to the congressional 
directive, characteristics for a national clearing and settlement system). 
99 SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 34. 
100The U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve actually began to implement a book-entry 
system before the Paper Crunch’s onset in 1966, albeit only for Treasury securities.  See 
Kenneth D. Garbade, Origins of the Federal Reserve Book-Entry System, FRBNY ECON.
POL’Y REV. 7-10 (forthcoming 2004), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/
forthcoming/garbade.pdf. See also generally Hamilton F. Potter, Jr. & David L. McLean, 
Introduction to Book Entry Transfer of Securities, 28 BUS. L. REV. 209 (1972). 
101 See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 94, at 185 (“The book entry system operates like the 
accounting system of the same name.”). 
102 The UCC briefly contemplated a purely uncertificated system, in which, “instead 
of surrendering an indorsed certificate for registration of transfer, an instruction would be 
sent to the issuer directing it to register the transfer.”  Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 3.  
This system, however, never completely materialized.  See, e.g., Schroeder & Carlson, 
supra note 89, at 559-60.  What actually emerged was the indirect holding system, in 
which “the issuer’s records do not show the identity of all of the beneficial owners.  
Instead, a large portion of the outstanding securities of any given issue are recorded on 
the issuer’s records as belonging to a depository.”  Prefatory Note, supra note 23, at 6.  
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still issue physical stock certificates, but they now typically are placed in 
the control of a depository,103 and registered in the name of a third party, 
or a “street name.”104 Clearing and settling occurs in three phases.105 
Customers first instruct their brokers to buy or sell the relevant securities.  
Brokers then send that instruction to the clearing corporation.  Finally, 
the clearing corporation proceeds to compare the reported information, 
debit or credit the appropriate trading account, and issue a report to the 
brokers indicating their net obligation to deliver or receive securities.106 
The book-entry system’s efficiency is attributable principally to a 
streamlining of the brokerage function.  Pre-SIPA, brokers were 
responsible for processing the legal sale and physical transfer of paper 
stock certificates.107 The book-entry system eliminated the need for 
physical transfer by bifurcating the process of legal sale.  Brokers remain 
responsible for negotiating and settling trades, but their clearance is now 
the responsibility of an independent intermediary, usually Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).108 This intermediary serves as 
 
This article focuses only on the indirect holding system and its complicating effect on the 
tracing requirement. 
103 In 1968, to track the transfer and volume of shares among its member broker-
dealers, the New York Stock Exchange established the Central Certificate Service (CCS).  
See DTCC:  Evolution of DTC and NSCC, http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/history.htm
(last visited Feb. 15, 2005).  In 1973 Depository Trust Company (DTC) was established 
to “immobilize securities for broker-dealers and banks, complete the book-entry delivery 
of those securities, and handle the myriad operational tasks required to provide 
centralized, automated processing.”  Id. DTC has subsumed CCS and is now the nation’s 
largest securities repository; at the end of 2003, DTC had decreased its paper stock 
holdings to 4.6 million, approximately 20 million less than over a decade ago.  See The 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, 2003 Annual Report:  Leading the 
Transformation, at 28 (2004), available at http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/annual.htm.
Along with the National Securities Clearing Corporation, DTC is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation.  See About DTCC,
http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); see also infra note 
108. 
104 See, e.g., Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Developments in Trading 
Claims:  Participations and Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 733, 747 (1993) 
(“Most securities are not held ‘of record’ by their true owners.”).  Most securities are 
registered in the name of Cede & Company, a partnership whose “sole function . . . is to 
maintain registered ownership of securities deposited with DTC.”  Mooney, supra note 
92, at 319 n.34; see also Joo, supra note 97, at 1073 n.3 (“Stock held in street name can 
represent as much as 80% of a public company’s outstanding shares.”). 
105 But cf. SEC, SAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 1 (“Clearance, 
settlement, depository and transfer functions form part of a continuous process.”). 
106 Guttman, supra note 23, at 724-26. 
107 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
108 Created in 1999, DTCC is owned by banks, brokers and dealers, mutual fund 
firms, and its two preferred shareholders, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
and New York Stock Exchange.  See About DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, 
Leaving Money on the Table:  Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities 
Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 868 n.69 (2002) (describing DTC as “an entity 
that owes much of its existence to the efficiency of not depending upon individual owners 
to physically deliver share certificates to an intermediary each time the securities are 
sold”).  Before DTCC, DTC was responsible for clearing functions.  See supra note 103. 
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the repository for stock certificates, thereby diminishing paper-based 
traffic and its corresponding costs.109 
This innovation to the clearing and settlement process, however, is 
not without consequences.  Brokers no longer act as intermediaries 
between an issuer and a securityholder.  Instead there is a series of 
interlocking contracts: 
[I]ndividual beneficial owners of securities have no 
direct contractual relationships with the depository--
rather, individuals have contractual relationships with 
their brokers, which in turn have contractual 
relationships with the depository or, as is often the case, 
relationships with another intermediary . . . which in turn 
is in privity with the depository.110 
A path, therefore, does exists from a securityholder to the depository, but 
there is no real connection between the depository and the issuer.  Thus 
there is no longer a path between the issuer and a securityholder.  
Further, the book-entry system centralizes custody of securities by 
altering their very nature:  securities are now fungible financial 
instruments.111 The use of a common nominee means that there is no real 
difference between any of the securities held by the depository; one 
security is as tradable as another.112 To be sure, this is what ensures that 
the book-entry system will not suffer from another Paper Crunch.  And 
that catastrophic collapse militates against revisiting any sort of 
processing system that depends on paper stock certificates.  
Nevertheless, the book-entry system has severed the securityholder’s 
relationships to a particular security and to its issuer. 
 
109 Computerizing the clearance process undeniably has reduced the need for paper 
stock certificates.  See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 92, at 320 n.37 (“The principal savings 
from eliminating certificates would relate to DTC[C]’s costs of physical storage, 
retrieval, deposit and withdrawal of certificates for participants’ customers.”).  This 
technological innovation, however, is distinct from and arguably less significant than the 
structural innovation of a centralized custodian of either paper or uncertificated securities.  
See, e.g., id. at 320 (“Even without actually eliminating paper certificates, the successful 
development by DTC[C] of the ‘book entry only’ (BEO) system for securities issuance 
and transfer has resulted in substantial savings for securities issuers.”). 
110 Joo, supra note 97, at 1073 n.3.  Privity here is distinct from what is required by 
section 12(a)(2).  See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
111 See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 92, at 319-20 n.34 (“Were the securities not part of 
a fungible bulk, much of the benefit of the intermediary control phenomenon would 
evaporate.”). 
112 See, e.g., id. at 310 (“The property interest received by a purchase on the books 
of its securities intermediary bears little resemblance to the property interest resulting 
from a physical delivery of a certificated security or registration on the books of an 
issuer.”).  But cf., e.g., Guttman, supra note 23, at 719 (“The system which is evolving is 
one applicable to the securities industry as such and does not affect the individual 
investor, unless the investor insists on becoming a registered owner of his shares or 
desires to hold the certificate himself . . . .”). 
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C. Doctrinal Methods 
 
The severance has cast doubt over which shareholders may have 
access to private civil remedies under the Securities Act for fraudulent 
offerings.  Neither section 11 nor 12(a)(2) provides an explicit answer.  
Section 11 merely states that “[i]n case any part of the registration 
statement” contains such misstatements or omissions, “any person 
acquiring such security . . . may, either at law or in equity, sue . . . .”113 
Similarly, section 12(a)(2) provides that “[a]ny person who . . . offers or 
sells a security . . . shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such 
security from him, who may sue either at law or equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction . . . .”114 Absent from these provisions is any 
sense of what “such security” one must purchase to be entitled to relief.115 
Is a remedy under the Securities Act available to a person who purchases 
any security similar to that issued in a particular offering?  Or must a 
person purchase a security actually issued in the relevant offering to be 
eligible for relief? 
The judicial answer comes in the form of a tracing requirement.  
Since 1967,116 courts have interpreted section 11 “as applying only to 
purchasers who can trace the lineage of their shares to the new offering . 
. .”;117 and, building on the troubling decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd 
Co.,118 courts subsequently have interpreted section 12(a)(2) as requiring 
 
113 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2004) (emphasis added); see also Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 
F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1967) (“The key phrase is ‘any person acquiring such security’; 
the difficulty, presented when as here the registration is of shares in addition to those 
already being traded, is that ‘such’ has no referent.”). 
114 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2004) (emphasis added). 
115 This is distinct from the grand question of what actually constitutes a “security.”  
See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, 923-1138.19. 
116 This slightly precedes the enactment of SIPA, which introduced the book-entry 
system.  See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
117 Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271; see also Curnin & Ford, supra note 11, at 165 n.60 
(citing cases); Sale, supra note 19, at 453 n.163 (citing cases).  Interestingly, the 
shareholder plaintiffs in Barnes were the ones who characterized this interpretation of 
section 11 as “tracing.”  Id. 
118 513 U.S. 561 (1995).  The Gustafson Court held that a private stock placement 
agreement did not constitute a “prospectus,” and thus was not sufficiently connected with 
an initial offering to be actionable under section 12(a)(2).  Id. at 583.  Prior to Gustafson 
a virtual consensus existed among courts and commentators that section 12(a)(2) 
permitted claims concerning secondary and private purchases of securities.  Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Gustafson observed that: 
Commentators writing shortly after passage of the Act understood § 
12(2) to cover resales and private sales, as well as public offerings. 
Felix Frankfurter, organizer of the team that drafted the statute, 
firmly stated this view. . . . Most subsequent commentators have 
agreed that § 12(2), like § 17(a), is not confined to public offerings. 
Id. at 601-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  Not surprisingly, the Court’s 
decision has been the subject of vigorous criticism.  See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, 
Securities Act Section 12(2):  After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. LAW. 1231, 1270 
(1995) (“[T]he majority opinion is at best bizarre and borders on the irresponsibly 
unintelligible.”). 
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plaintiffs to “trace” their securities to an initial public offering.119 In 
essence tracing withholds access to private civil relief unless plaintiffs 
can prove that they purchased a security from a specific public offering 
involving a material misstatement or omission.120 
The requirement can be understood by its impact on three primary 
classes of securityholders, defined by their proximity to a public 
offering.121 The first class comprises securityholders that have 
unmediated access to a public offering (Class I), a limited group that 
includes institutional investors and underwriters as well as their spinning 
partners.122 The second class comprises securityholders that have access 
the public offering only through a secondary market (Class II), otherwise 
known as the “aftermarket.”123 Finally, the third class comprises 
securityholders that have no access to a public offering (Class III), but 
instead purchase similar types of securities in a different offering.124 
These classes have varying access to private civil remedies under the 
Securities Act depending on the tracing method a court may apply.  
Direct Tracing, “the easiest method to understand and prove,”125 is 
 
119 See, e.g., Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp. 964 F.2d 272, 287 (3d Cir. 1992) (“If 
defendants were eventually to prove that the shares came from the secondary market, § 
12(2) would not apply, and judgment would be entered for them.”); see also supra notes 
118 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, only the Third and Eleventh Circuits have 
made an explicit appellate reference to the tracing requirement under section 12(a)(2).  
See, e.g., First Union Disc. Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 
1993) (“[W]e are persuaded by the Third Circuit’s reasoning and hold that section 12(2) 
of the 1933 Act does not apply to aftermarket transactions.”) (citations omitted); see also 
Sale, supra note 19, at 454 nn.164-67 (citing district court cases).  Other courts instead 
tend to discuss tracing under section 12(a)(2) in the guise of either the privity 
requirement, see supra note 83 and accompanying text, or aftermarket purchases, see 
infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text. 
120 Sale, supra note 19, at 441 (“Courts use the term ‘tracing’ to refer to the 
judicially created requirement that to access sections 11 and 12(a)(2) shareholders must 
plead and prove that they bought shares issued either ‘in’ the public offering for which 
the registration statement or prospectus was issued, or ‘pursuant to’ that offering.”) 
(citing Feiner v. SS&C Techs., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (D. Conn. 1999)). 
121 See supra note 30. 
122 See, e.g., In re:  Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 3857, 
01 Civ. 8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL 
2297401, at *37-*39 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004) (citing cases).  See also Hillary A. Sale, 
Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 415 (2003) 
(“Members of Congress have benefited from investment bank largesse.  Some members 
benefited from spinning, receiving IPO shares at the offering price that they were allowed 
to flip in the market at easy profits.”).  See also supra note 32. 
123 See, e.g., In re:  IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *37-*39 (citing cases).  Small and 
individual investors are usually Class II securityholders as they “can rarely get in on . . . 
hot initial public offerings (IPOs) because IPOs are largely private club[s] that the 
average investor [i]sn’t invited to join.”  Sale, supra note 19, at 441 (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
124 See, e.g., id. at 443. 
125 Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (D. Minn. 1984), aff’d, 760 F.2d 
272 (8th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).  Notably, the Supreme Court has 
rejected the need for Direct Tracing in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2004), which 
governs theft or bribery in connection with programs receiving federal funds.  See, e.g.,
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).  See also United States v. Cabrera, 328 F.3d 
506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “circuits have since split on whether to require a 
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correspondingly also the most accepted.126 Courts assess a plaintiff’s 
ability to trace their purchased securities directly back to a specific 
offering by examining multiple factors: 
[A]n indication of interest by the broker on behalf of the 
customer, the customer’s receipt of a preliminary 
prospectus with a legend in red ink (called a “red 
herring”), a notation on the purchase order ticket 
showing purchase in the offering, purchase at the 
offering price, lack of commission, language regarding 
the prospectus on the customer’s confirmation slip, and 
special coding of the transaction by the brokerage 
firm.127 
Satisfying these factors is relatively easy for Class I securityholders, as 
they have an opportunity to purchase a security prior to its entrance into 
the aftermarket. 
Class II and III securityholders, however, face a significant practical 
problem.  Courtesy of the book-entry system, these two classes of 
securityholders are simply beneficial owners, and not record holders, of 
publicly offered securities.128 And, because of centralized repositories, 
these securities are fungible.129 This is unproblematic when an issuer has 
conducted only one offering, as its connection to all of the securities 
purchased is inferentially clear.130 But issuers can, and often do, conduct 
multiple offerings.131 In such circumstances courts have held that “a 
plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that she has satisfied the tracing 
requirement . . . only if every such offering was defective.”132 
Accordingly, whenever one among multiple offerings is non-fraudulent, 
Class II and III securityholders cannot trace their aftermarket purchases. 
The Fungible Mass Tracing method attempts to address this problem.  
Statistical probability determines whether a particular security is part of a 
specific public offering.  Courts calculate this probability by simply 
dividing the number of shares issued in the disputed public offering by 
the number of total shares issued in all public offerings.  In the case of 
one offering the probability would be 100% that the plaintiffs purchased 
securities in connection with material misstatements or omissions.  In the 
case of multiple offerings the probability must be “some particular 
 
federal nexus [between theft or bribery and expenditure of federal funds], with [the 
Second and Third Circuits] requiring one and [the Sixth and Seventh Circuits] holding 
that none is required”). 
126 See, e.g., In re:  IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *37-*39 (citing cases). 
127 Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378 (citation omitted). 
128 See supra notes 104, 110-112, and accompanying text. 
129 See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. 
130 See, e.g., In re:  IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38 (“Tracing may be established . . 
. through proof that the owner bought her shares in a market containing only shares issued 
pursuant to an allegedly defective registration statement.”) (emphasis added). 
131 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
132 In re:  IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *39 (emphasis added). 
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number” that constitutes a preponderance of the evidence,133 roughly 
quantified by some courts and commentators as greater than 50%.134 
Courts, however, generally have rejected the Fungible Mass method 
within the securities context.  First, the method establishes only that 
certain securities “might,” and not actually, have been issued in a 
specific fraudulent offering; this is an inferential leap in causation that 
courts have refused to make.135 Second, the method provides remedies to 
an overinclusive class of securityholders; provided the requisite 
probability obtains, even plaintiffs with non-fraudulent securities could 
trace successfully.136 
A more reliable and less inclusive method is Contrabroker Tracing.  
Under this method securityholders need to demonstrate a chain of 
purchase from a broker to another broker or underwriter that directly 
participated in the disputed offering.137 Proof of an underwriter’s 
involvement, however, does not dispositively connect a security with the 
offering; underwriters can be market-makers that facilitate over-the-
counter trading by buying and selling securities that may not be from the 
relevant offering.138 Moreover, the method is still overinclusive; 
provided the contrabroking link exists, any securities purchased from that 
broker or underwriter would enable any plaintiff to satisfy the tracing 
requirement.139 
Similar to the Contrabroker method’s focus on underwriters, the 
Heritage method looks to the stock certificates for a causal link.  The 
method, the “most complex” one recognized by courts,140 follows the 
path of stock certificates that bear unique code numbers from brokers to 
purchasers.  Not all stock certificates, however, bear unique code 
numbers.141 Moreover, stock certificates reflect the increments 
 
133 Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1379; see also infra notes 242-243 and accompanying 
text. 
134 See, e.g., In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D. Mass 1987).  
See also infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
135 See, e.g., In re:  IPO, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38-*39 (citing cases). 
136 See, e.g., Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1380 (“Even if the court somehow limited 
the class of plaintiffs to those who held shares on  or after the offering date, all persons 
who held stock in street on and after the offering date could claim a proportional interest 
in the shares.  The issuer could find itself liable for far more than the number of shares 
issued in the challenged offering.”). 
137 See, e.g., Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1381.  No plaintiff has convinced a court to 
apply this method, and so it is not discussed extensively here. 
138 See, e.g., Mark A. Allebach, Small Business, Equity Financing, and the Internet:  
The Evolution of a Solution?, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 3, 63 (1999) (“In a standard offering, 
the underwriter may function as a market maker for the stock, facilitating secondary 
trading.”). 
139 Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1381 (“Obviously at some point plaintiffs’ assumption 
must be false; otherwise anyone who ever purchased from a participant in the 
underwriting after the offering date could claim he or she bought ‘new’ stock under this 
contrabroker theory.”). 
140 Id. at 1382.  As with the Contrabroker method, no plaintiff has convinced a court 
to apply the Heritage method, and so it is not discussed extensively here. 
141 See, e.g., Sale, supra note 19, at 452 n. 153 (“Today . . . the usual practice is to 
hold shares in street names.  As a result, this [heritage] method is unlikely to prove 
fruitful for modern shareholders.”).  A simple solution might be to require all brokers or 
V.2.00  11/16/2005 
2005] TRACING 25 
purchased, and not the specific offering involved.142 Accordingly, the 
Heritage method provides perhaps the most speculative evidence of 
causation between a securityholder’s purchase and an issuer’s 
misstatements or omissions. 
All of these tracing methods, however, suffer from the same glaring 
problem.  Whenever there are multiple offerings, the tracing requirement 
arbitrarily segregates according to the securityholder class.143 Only Class 
I securityholders have any reliable access to private civil remedies under 
the Securities Act.  Class II and III securityholders, however, must 
overcome all the difficulties associated with the use of fungible securities 
registered in street name.  Accomplishing this feat, as courts have 
acknowledged, is “virtually impossible.”144 Indeed, all of these possible 
tracing methods are effectively an attempt to assist Class II and III 
securityholders in this regard.  But because this is a substantial group of 
securityholders, the stringent application of the tracing requirement 
inadvertently confers a benefit on defendants involved in multiple 
offerings.  As long as one of them involves non-fraudulent securities, 
these defendants can eliminate or reduce their liability under sections 11 
and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.145 The net effect, then, is that the 
tracing requirement represents a way to avoid private civil remedies, and 
thereby severely compromises their deterrence effect. 
 
II. REMEDIAL TRACING 
Part I established deficiencies within securities law’s tracing 
requirement.  These deficiencies prompt one to look beyond the 
securities context and examine conceptions of tracing in other areas of 
the law.  This examination begins, and ends, with remedial law, the 
original source of tracing. 
Remedial tracing is a venerable product of civil law.  The method’s 
heritage is manifest in an ongoing controversy over distinct conceptions 
of tracing in equity and at common law.  The justification for all 
conceptions of tracing, however, lies in restitution.  Conventional 
restitution seeks to redress unjust enrichment by disgorging benefits 
 
centralized holding companies to keep records of which security is sold or purchased.  
This is akin to the more conceptually sound designation system that I propose.  See infra 
Part III.C. 
142 Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1381. 
143 See, e.g., Barnes v. v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1967) (“[T]his 
construction [of the tracing requirement] gives . . . a rather accidental impact as between 
one open-market purchaser of a stock already being traded and another.”); Klein v. 
Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 273 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“If the purchaser 
bought identical securities already being traded on the open market, he must look 
elsewhere for relief.”). 
144 In re:  Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 3857, 01 Civ. 
8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL 2297401, at *38 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004); see also id. at *38 n.402 (“The advent of fungible bulk storage 
has made plaintiffs’ tracing requirement a stringent one indeed . . . . “). 
145 See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B. 
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inequitably gained at another’s expense, while specific restitution seeks 
to restore misappropriated value to its original owner. 
Rules-based tracing reconciles both forms of restitution.  Unlike 
other competing conceptions, rules-based tracing does not focus on 
assets or property, but rather the value inherent in things.  The first step 
is to determine whether misappropriated value has traveled into a 
wrongdoer’s hands; this is part of an exercise known as “following,” 
which is a factual inquiry that enables one ultimately to claim specific 
restitution.  Tracing, however, involves a substitution of value.  The 
second step, then, is to determine whether certain value in a wrongdoer’s 
possession is derived from misappropriated value, and thus subject to a 
claim of unjust enrichment. 
Rules-based tracing also fares well with the classic problem of 
commingled funds.  The difficulty lies in the fact that such funds are 
fungible instruments, as in the case of a bank account.  Courts have 
devised a myriad of rules for tracing through bank accounts where there 
has been a deposit or withdrawal of the wrongdoer’s own funds.  These 
rules, which focus on assets or property, are not necessarily inconsistent 
with a focus on value.  But rules-based tracing does present a more 
principled approach to bank accounts, by understanding them as a simple 
exchange in value. 
This Part completes the foundation necessary to set up the ultimate 
intradisciplinary comparison between tracing within the securities and 
remedial contexts.  Although mindful of corollary securities notions, the 
analysis here is not explicitly comparative.  Rather, the analysis provides 
a parallel account of rules-based tracing that ultimately suggests how it 
may be applied to fungible securities. 
 
A. Equitable and Legal Formulations 
The origins of tracing date back to early eighteenth century civil 
jurisprudence.146 English courts introduced the method as a way to 
protect the ownership rights of beneficiaries in res from errant trustees.147 
Specifically, the doctrine entitled beneficiaries to claim the proceeds of 
 
146 See, e.g., Kendar v. Milward, 23 Eng. Rep. 882 (1702); Halcott v. Markant, 24 
Eng. Rep. 81 (1701).  For early American applications and analyses of remedial tracing, 
see Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U.S. 707 (1914); National Bank v. Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54 
(1881); James Barr Ames, Following Misappropriated Property Into Its Product, 19 
HARV. L. REV. 511 (1906); Samuel Williston, The Right to Follow Trust Property When 
Confused With Other Property, 2 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1888).  Among the doctrine’s 
glorious applications involved Charles K. Ponzi’s pyramid scheme at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  See In re Ponzi, 268 F. 997 (D. Mass 1920); Lowell v. Brown, 280 F. 
193 (D. Mass 1922); Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924).  In adjudicating claims 
against Ponzi’s estate Chief Justice William Taft opined that various creditors “must trace 
the money, and therein they have failed.”  Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 11. 
147 Oesterle, supra note 43, at 186, 187 (noting that the birth of tracing “was 
understandable:  to provide relief against errant trustees, English equity courts granted 
beneficiaries a proprietary right to follow misappropriated property into its product” and 
that this right “was a fictional extension of the beneficiary’s fluid equitable ownership 
interest in the trust res”).  Oesterle provides a rich, historical account of remedial tracing.  
See id. at 186-95. 
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misappropriated res that a predatory trustee already had converted into a 
different form.  As one court explained, 
[i]t makes no difference in reason or law into what other 
form different from the original, the change may have 
been made . . . for the product of or substitute for the 
original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself, 
as long as it can be ascertained to be such . . . .148 
Such indifference to the proceeds’ ultimate form is possible because 
tracing focuses on what lies in the custody of the wrongdoer, rather than 
the whereabouts of the misappropriated res. This focus is premised on a 
judicial assumption that the transfer of misappropriated res was valid.149 
Characteristic of its vintage, tracing has concurrent equitable and 
legal roots.150 Equity conferred a proprietary right upon the original 
owner of misappropriated res to its proceeds; this conferral was 
predicated on the wrongdoer assuming the role of a trustee that had 
breached its fiduciary duty towards its principal, the original owner.151 In 
contrast, the common law did not recognize the trust,152 and instead 
 
148 Taylor v. Plumer, 105 Eng. Rep. 721, 726 (1815); see also In re Hallet’s Estate, 
13 Ch. D. 696, 708-09 (1879) (“There is no distinction. . . between a rightful and 
wrongful disposition of the property, so far as regards the right of the beneficial owner to 
follow the proceeds.”) (emphasis added).  But see infra Part II.B. 
149 See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 188 (“[A]t the plaintiff’s election a court 
would presume conclusively that the errant trustee had acted with proper authority when 
the exchange was made.  This simple fiction of regularity was the seed of all current 
tracing doctrine.”) (citing cases). 
150 See, e.g., Paul Matthews, The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing,
in LAUNDERING AND TRACING 23, 31-32 (Peter H. Birks ed., 1995) (“There are two 
different sets of rules of tracing:  those for tracing at common law, and those for tracing in 
Equity. . . .”) (emphasis in original).  Matthews maintains that this distinction makes 
sense even in light of the merger of law and equity within the United States: 
[I]f tracing has different rules at law and in equity, that is because the 
rules were evolved to deal with different situations, and still do so. . . 
. It may be pedagogically and analytically sensible to put both 
systems together (without changing any rules) and to treat the 
composite whole as ‘the rules of tracing’, although, given the 
importance of history in understanding English law, I am inclined to 
think that this would obscure rather more than it would illuminate. 
Id. at 32 (emphasis in original); see also N.E. PALMER, BAILMENT 290 (2d ed. 1991) 
(“This view that the common law doctrine of tracing has been fused with its equitable 
counterpart has rightly been described as an expression of hope rather than a statement of 
reality and weakens the expression of view accordingly.”); infra note 152. 
151 See, e.g., ROY M. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW § 11(ii), 52-53 (3d ed. 2004). 
152 Considerable controversy exists within the civil law over whether common law 
tracing requires a fiduciary relationship between the original owner of property and its 
converter.  See, e.g., Michael Scott, The Right to “Trace” at Common Law, 7 U.W. AUS.
L. REV. 463, 479 (1966) (“At common law . . . no fiduciary relationship needs to be 
postulated . . . .  It should not be necessary at this date to argue this last point; and within 
the limits of this article it is scarcely possible, without wading into [a] morass of 
academic controversy . . . .”).  Lionel Smith disagrees: 
It is sometimes said that a prerequisite to tracing in a court of equity 
is the establishment of a fiduciary relationship.  If this were true, the 
consequences would be startling. . . . It is to be hoped that courts will 
heed the weight of academic commentary and discard the notion that 
a fiduciary relation is a prerequisite to tracing in equity. 
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regarded the wrongdoer as a bailee whose sale of misappropriated goods 
conferred the original owner with legal title to their proceeds.153 
Although the differences are hardly trivial,154 these conceptions of 
tracing do share a common principle.  As Lionel Smith has noted, 
equitable and legal tracing both “subordinate the interests of wrongdoers 
in the same way” and also are “willing to treat non-wrongdoers 
equally.”155 When presented with a choice between these parties, tracing 
harnesses the powerful intuition that the law should relegate the 
wrongdoer’s interests beneath those of the victim and any third party.156 
And, by extension, even when the wrongdoer misappropriates and then 
converts something into greater value, tracing can award that entire value 
to the victim.157 
The rationale for tracing is rooted within restitution itself.  The law 
of restitution, which concerns “benefit-based liability or benefit-based 
 
SMITH, supra note 43, at 120, 130 (citations omitted)).  There is even dispute over the 
significance of tracing at common law.  Compare, e.g., Scott, supra, at 466 (referencing 
“the very pertinent fact that the great majority of ‘tracing’ cases are cases arising out of 
common law relationships”), with SIR ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION 48 (2d ed. 1978) (“In restitution the common law of tracing has been in 
practice of little importance. . . . [E]quity has successfully intervened to enable claimants 
to trace money and negotiable instruments, particularly when money has become mixed 
with other money in a bank account.”).  This fiduciary requirement historically has not 
held true in American courts.  See Oesterle, supra note 43, at 187 (“For years American 
courts could afford to be lax on the matter because they do not require a fiduciary 
relationship for tracing relief in equity.”).  In any event the intradisciplinary conception 
of tracing proposed here revolves around the Securities Act, which awards monetary 
relief.  See infra Part III.B. 
153 See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 150, at 288 (“At common law, [a proprietary 
claim] entails that the claimant should have an immediate right to possession of the goods 
as against the defendant.”). 
154 See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 52-53 (comparing historical 
conceptions of tracing in equity and law); Scott, supra note 152, at 479 (observing that 
common law and equitable tracing differ in that “(a) the consequent right of action at 
common law is not in personam, but in equity in rem, and (b) the common law right of 
action can thus survive the loss or destruction of the res, while the equitable right of 
action depends upon its continued possession by the defendant”). 
155 SMITH, supra note 43, at 278.  This is in contrast to the proprietary rights 
rationale that other commentators frequently cite in support of tracing.  See, e.g.,
PALMER, supra note 150, at 287-88 (“There are a number of reasons why a person may 
wish to employ the proprietary remedy of tracing . . . .  The most obvious reason is that a 
person who has the right to trace will take priority over other creditors in the case of an 
insolvency. . . .”). 
156 See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 176-77 (“[T]he basic tracing paradigm has 
substantial intuitive appeal.  Notions of vindicating title, of deterring misappropriation, of 
disgorging unlawfully acquired profits . . . all seem to coalesce in support of the result.”); 
see also supra note 45. 
157 See, e.g., id. at 176 (“In sum, courts find it more desirable to give the victim a 
windfall . . . than to allow the wrongdoer to keep any profit.”).  The most extreme version 
of this principle is the “swollen assets” theory courts applied to bankruptcy cases during 
the Great Depression.  Upon a mere showing of an equitable wrong, courts would award 
prioritized claims to certain victims over other third party creditors when the funds had 
become commingled in an insolvent bank; most civil and common law courts reject this 
theory.  See, e.g., id. at 189 n.33.  But see, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF 
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 6.1(3), at 14 (1993) (“There is some 
authority taking a more liberal view [of the swollen assets theory]. . . .”) (citing cases). 
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recovery,”158 encompasses two distinct principles.159 First, “specific 
restitution” provides relief in the form of restoration of the actual 
misappropriated asset or property to its original owner.160 Second, unjust 
enrichment provides various forms of relief to victims at whose expense 
another party has obtained legally unjustifiable gains.161 
Conventional conceptions of tracing can involve either of these 
restitutionary principles.  On one level tracing can provide specific 
restitution to victims that identify misappropriated assets or property 
within the hands of a defendant or a third party.162 On another level 
tracing can redress unjust enrichment when there has been a substitution 
or commingling of the victim’s misappropriated assets or property with 
 
158 HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 1 (2004). 
159 This distinction is the subject of intense controversy.  See, e.g., Colleen P. 
Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577, 1581-98 (2002).  
Both the Restatement of the Law of Restitution and a significant group of civil and 
common law scholars equate restitution with unjust enrichment.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 1; 1 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 1.1, at 6 (“[R]estitution 
today is a general term for diverse kinds of recoveries aimed at preventing unjust 
enrichment of the defendant and measured by the defendant’s gains . . . .”); Andrew Kull, 
Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 17, 17 (2003) (“The modern consensus puts 
unjust enrichment at the heart of liability in restitution, so the question, simply put, is 
whether restitution properly includes anything else.”).  Other scholars believe unjust 
enrichment is but a subdivision of restitution.  See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 294 
(“The goal of restitution is to reverse the transfer of wealth from the plaintiff to the 
defendant.”); Laycock, supra note 47, at 1279 (“’Restitution’ means recovery based on 
and measured by unjust enrichment.  It also means restoration in kind of a specific thing.  
Both usages are part of any complete definition of restitution.”).  But cf., e.g., Oesterle, 
supra note 43, at 176 n.9 (“Restitution is most commonly understood . . . as a grab bag of 
judge-made rules developed originally in both the early Anglo-American law and equity 
courts.”).  I take no position on the distinction, but use it only to clarify a subsequent 
distinction between claiming, following, and tracing.  See infra Part II.B. 
160 Laycock, supra note 47, at 1279-80 (“[R]estitution continues to include remedies 
that restore to plaintiff the specific thing he lost or that undo disrupted transactions and 
restores both parties to their original positions in kind.”); see also RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS, supra note 45, § 372(1) (“Specific restitution will be granted to a party who 
is entitled to restitution.”); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 4, cmt. c 
(“Specific restitution in actions at law”).  Laycock believes there is a third sense of 
restitution, compensatory damages, id. at 1282, which is not discussed as the Securities 
Act’s remedies are based on a deterrence theory, see supra note 85 and accompanying 
text.  See also Murphy, supra note 159, at 1586 (asserting that prominent restitutionary 
theorists “would agree that ‘restitution’ must be distinguished from ‘compensation,’ a 
remedy measured by the plaintiff’s loss”). 
161 See, e.g., GOFF & JONES, supra note 152, at 11 (“There are many circumstances 
in which a defendant may find himself in possession of a benefit which, in justice, he 
should restore to the plaintiff. . . . ‘Unjust Enrichment’ is, simply, the name which is 
commonly given to the principle of justice which the law recognises [sic] and gives effect 
to in a wide variety of claims of this kind.”); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 
CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1995) (“Restitution, meaning the law of unjust enrichment . . . 
[bases liability on the principle] that the defendant has been enriched without legal 
justification at the expense of the plaintiff; it is not that the defendant has necessarily 
done anything wrong.”); Nicholas J. McBride & Paul McGrath, The Nature of 
Restitution, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (1995) (contending that restitution entails only 
a common law duty borne by the defendant to correct unjust enrichment). 
162 See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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those of a defendant or third party.163 Under either principle conventional 
tracing thus represents a powerful re-allocative tool.  The method enables 
courts to impose the full costs of misappropriation on a wrongdoer, while 
shifting all of the benefits to a victim ex post.
B. Rules-Based Tracing 
Like the myriad of forms that misappropriated assets or property can 
assume, the doctrine of tracing has mutated over time.  According to 
Lionel Smith, “[t]he complexity of tracing has been exacerbated by a 
history of inexact use of language, and a consequent failure to distinguish 
it from related matters.”164 Courts and commentators have referred to 
tracing within and across legal contexts as “claiming,”165 “identifying,”166 
“following,”167 “standing,”168 and “transactional links.”169 This semantic 
confusion only complicates the substantive controversy over equitable 
versus legal conceptions of tracing,170 and its basis in restitution as either 
restoration or unjust enrichment.171 
A way out of this morass is to have a principled understanding of 
tracing, or what Lionel Smith calls “rules-based tracing.”172 This 
conception presents tracing as a process by which courts apply legal 
 
163 See infra Part II.C.  See also Oesterle, supra note 43, at 175-76 (observing that 
some theorists “argue that tracing is restitutionary in that the doctrine is premised on the 
principle of unjust enrichment – the conceptual thread that is said to unite all 
restitutionary doctrines.”).  Oesterle, however, contends that “[t]he principle of unjust 
enrichment cannot be defensibly invoked to justify most of the numerous applications of 
tracing” because the doctrine is actually “a complicated façade for a rough doctrine of 
causation.”  Id. at 190. 
164 SMITH, supra note 43, at 3. 
165 See, e.g., GOFF & JONES, supra note 152, at 46-63. 
166 See, e.g., BIRKS, supra note 45, at 358 (“The exercise of identifying the surviving 
enrichment is called tracing.”); David Hayton, Equity’s Identification Rules, in BIRKS,
supra note 150, 1, 1 (“[T]he equitable rules where new assets have been acquired in place 
of the original trust property . . . endeavour [sic] to identify the value of the original 
property in new assets so as to ascertain the value surviving in the defendant’s hands.”); 
Scott, supra note 152, at 478 (“[T]he word ‘trace’ is commonly used . . . as meaning no 
more than ‘identify.’”). 
167 See, e.g., Roy M. Goode, The Right to Trace and Its Impact in Commercial 
Transactions-I, 92 L. Q. REV. 361, 369 (1976) (“[T]he right to follow denotes a right to 
trace the asset into a changed form . . . .”); Williston, supra note 146, at 30 (referencing 
the “right the cestui que trust always has, even though he may also be able to follow his 
money into a certain investment”).  See also supra note 148. 
168 See supra note 12. 
169 See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 174 (“The plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving any transactional link between the misappropriated property and the property 
found in the defendant’s hands.”).  But cf. Simon Evans, Rethinking Tracing and the Law 
of Restitution, 115 L. Q. REV. 469 (1999) (challenging the need for tracing to involve a 
transactional link between the initial and surviving enrichment). 
170 See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. 
172 This is in contrast to the rights-based conception of tracing advanced by many 
commentators.  See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 173 (defining tracing as a 
“restitutionary right to claim specific property . . . that arises from a property interest of 
the claimant in other property that another has misappropriated”).  See also supra note 
155. 
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rules that determine whether certain value in a wrongdoer’s hands is 
derivative of misappropriated value, and thus subject to a justifiable legal 
claim.173 Significantly, unlike competing conceptions, rules-based 
tracing focuses on value, rather than specific assets or property.  This is 
because tracing fundamentally concerns situations where a substitution 
of misappropriated assets or property for other assets or property has 
occurred: 
The only connection which the plaintiff has to the new 
thing is that it was acquired with the original thing. . . . 
What is traced, then, is the value inherent in things.  It is 
value, not property or assets, which can be identified in 
different forms after each substitution.  The grammatical 
object of ‘to trace’ is ‘value.’174 
This is because no other component of tracing purely captures the 
illicitness that the process seeks to remedy.  Certainly, there is no 
principled basis in focusing on the actual exchange between the 
wrongdoer and an innocent third party, as that act can be legal.175 And 
there is no principled basis in focusing on the specific path of the 
property or assets, either of the misappropriated or substituted sort.  On 
the one hand, the path of the misappropriated property or assets simply 
diverts the inquiry to an innocent third party that is equal to the victim in 
the eyes of tracing.176 On the other hand, the path of substituted property 
or assets does lead to the wrongdoer, but without any evidence of the 
actual wrongdoing.177 
Value properly orients the tracing inquiry.  Fundamentally, value is 
what the wrongdoer has misappropriated from the victim.  Value is also a 
sufficiently abstract notion to accommodate the shift to substituted 
 
173 See GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 53 (“[T]racing is . . . merely a legal 
mechanism to establish that a benefit received by the defendant can be identified as 
resulting from a diminution in the plaintiff’s assets.”);  SMITH, supra note 43, at 6 
(“Tracing identifies a new thing as the potential subject matter of a claim, on the basis 
that it is the substitute for an original thing which was itself the subject matter of a 
claim.”). 
174 Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
175 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  Moreover, the form of the exchange 
need not be the same for tracing to apply.  See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 
53 (“[A]n improper transfer of value by novation is just as traceable as a transfer of value 
by assignment.”). 
176 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
177 The substituted property’s path may not even end up involving the wrongdoer, as 
tracing still applies when the substituted property is in the custody of an intermediary or a 
fourth party.  Moreover, value can encompass scenarios in which both the wrongdoer 
possesses both misappropriated and substituted property; one such instance involves a 
company that redeems outstanding debt through the issuance of stock or proceeds from 
lower cost debt.  See, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 
570 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying injunctive relief against such redemption 
even in light of a prohibitory clause in an indenture).  Borrowing companies can avoid 
this question altogether simply by entering into an interest rate swap agreement while 
issuing debt.  I thank Lawrence A. Cunningham for this point. 
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property that the victim seeks to claim.178 As one commentator has 
observed, the notion of value eliminates the “need to show any physical 
correlation between the asset the plaintiff lost and the asset the defendant 
received.”179 Equally important, value “inheres in rights, where they are 
rights in tangible things or not” and thus “simply reifies that which 
inheres in an asset . . . .”180 In this way value also serves as a principled 
basis for the victim’s claim.181 
Reconceptualizing the method in this way clarifies two analytically 
distinct processes that are often conflated with tracing itself.182 The first 
process is what Professor Smith denotes “following.”  This is an entirely 
factual and mechanical exercise of locating the misappropriated value 
that originally belonged to the victim; following “is not a claim or a right 
in itself. . . . By itself, it does not make anyone liable.”183 Liability is the 
domain of the second process, what Professor Smith denotes “claiming.”  
This is a justificatory exercise of determining whether liability attaches; 
claiming affords the victim rights to value, of either the misappropriated 
or substituted sort.184 
178 See SMITH, supra note 43, at 119 (“[Value] is the only constant that exists before, 
through and after the substitution through which we trace.  It exists in a different form 
after the substitution, and that is what can justify a claim to the new asset.”).  Another 
way to conceptualize value is as a category enabling different assets or property to 
become fungible.  See, e.g., Goode, supra note 166, at 383 (“Fungibles are tangible assets 
of which one unit is, in terms of an obligation owed by one party to another, 
indistinguishable from any other unit . . . .”).  This is not to say that the exchange 
between the wrongdoer and an innocent third party consists of equivalent value.  See id. 
at 157 (“The concept of ‘tracing value’ does not imply or entail that the traceable 
proceeds of an asset must have a market value equivalent to the market value of that 
asset.”).  Because the wrongdoer knowingly provides misappropriated value, that may be 
or command less than what a legally acquired value would on the market.  See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1196 (1985) (“Since I am unwilling (because unable--but it does not matter why) to pay 
[the original owner’s] price for [the misappropriated value], it follows that the 
[misappropriated value] would be less valuable in an economic sense in my hands than in 
his.”). 
179 GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 53. 
180 SMITH, supra note 43, at 16. 
181 Tracing does not by itself generate liability.  See id. at 132; infra note 183 and 
accompanying text. 
182 The distinction between following, claiming, and tracing is not merely 
theoretical.  See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, at § 11 (ii), at 53 (“These concepts have 
now been endorsed by the highest authority.”) (citing Foskett v. McKeown, 1 A.C. 102, 
128 (2002)).  American courts implicitly make the same distinction.  See, e.g., In re 
United Cigar Stores Co., 70 F.2d 313, 316 (2d Cir. 1934) (“There can be no recovery . . . 
where all that can be shown is enrichment of the trustee.”  Misappropriated trust property 
“must be clearly traced and identified in specific property.”). 
183 SMITH, supra note 43, at 10.  According to Smith, 
[t]he most salient difference between the exercise of tracing and the 
exercise of following is that the latter can be exclusively factual.  
Following can involve no more than the proof that a particular thing 
was in a certain place at a certain time.  Tracing, on the other hand, 
always involves the application of legal rules. 
Id. at 11. 
184 See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii), at 53. 
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Although they can be stand-alone processes, following and claiming 
overlap with the tracing process.  The first step is to follow the path of 
the misappropriated value from the victim to the wrongdoer.  At that 
point, the paths diverge.185 On the one hand, continuing the exercise of 
following would lead to an innocent third party and an attempt to restore 
the original value back to the victim, i.e., specific restitution.186 On the 
other hand, abandoning the exercise of following would lead to the 
exercise of claiming that substituted value in the wrongdoer’s custody is 
a legally unjustified benefit at the victim’s expense, i.e., unjust 
enrichment.187 This latter step completes the tracing exercise, which thus 
neither follows the misappropriated value to its ultimate resting point nor 
claims that the substituted value justifiably belongs to the victim.188 All 
that concerns tracing is recognizing substituted value. 
 
C. Doctrinal Methods 
The litmus test for any conception of remedial tracing is the problem 
of commingled funds.  As one commentator has observed, “[i]t was at 
one time thought that once money had reached the hands of a banker or 
broker, it was absolutely merged, not traceable, and so not recoverable, 
whatever might be the claimant’s rights against the customer.”189 Unlike 
the basic tracing scenario involving an exchange of value between a 
wrongdoer and a third party, commingled funds introduce another 
wrinkle.  Commingling enables the wrongdoer to substitute fungible 
value,190 or more cynically, to launder money.191 
185 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 8 (“Sometimes a plaintiff will want to conduct 
both exercises, tracing and following. . . . Both exercises cannot . . . be conducted in 
relation to the same transaction, except of course as alternatives, because they are 
mutually inconsistent.”). 
186 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
188 But see, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(3), at 11 (“The purpose of 
constructive trust, equitable lien and even subrogation, is to require restitution to prevent 
unjust enrichment.”). 
189 MARK HAPGOOD, PAGET’S LAW OF BANKING 177 (10th ed. 1989).  Indeed, many 
civil law commentators maintain that 
[t]he common law will not trace through a mixed fund. . . . In other 
words, at common law, the question whether anything survives in 
your hands becomes a question whether there is anything which you 
hold as the result of one or more clean substitutions, without adding 
outside funds to those originally received. 
BIRKS, supra note 45, at 359.  But see, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 162-74, 174 
(challenging this view, as part of a broader conception of tracing that does not abide by 
the distinction between equity and law, because “[t]he rules of tracing tell us when an 
asset counts as the substitute for or proceeds of another asset”); see also supra notes 150-
154 and accompanying text. 
190 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 161-62 (“This situation has multiple inputs, 
and multiple outputs as well.  It is impossible definitively to ascribe the value being 
traced to either of the outputs.”).  The wrongdoer need not be entitled to the additional 
source of value, as it may come from another illicit transaction. 
191 See generally Stephen Moriarty, Tracing, Mixing and Laundering, in BIRKS,
supra note 150, at 73. 
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Courts have devised a myriad of rules for tracing commingled funds.  
The elementary case involves a bank account that contains a fixed 
amount of the wrongdoer’s own value and the misappropriated value.  In 
this case the victim can claim the full amount of the traceable 
misappropriated value,192 even if the wrongdoer deposits additional value 
into the commingled fund.193 
The intermediate case involves a commingled bank account from 
which the wrongdoer has withdrawn value.  The dominant approach is to 
employ a pari passu rule.194 Courts award the victim a proportionate 
interest in the wrongdoer’s bank account at the time it becomes 
commingled with the misappropriated value.  When the wrongdoer only 
withdraws funds from the bank account, the victim maintains a claim to a 
proportionate interest in the remaining traceable value.195 When, 
however, the wrongdoer has withdrawn and also deposited value within 
the bank account, courts use what is known as the Lowest Intermediate 
 
192 See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 16 (“In the simplest situation . . . 
[t]he plaintiff is entitled to a lien on the commingled fund in the amount of his own 
monies traced to it.”); HAPGOOD, supra note 189, at 178 (“[S]o long as money is 
traceable either in specie or in its proceeds or investment, equity will follow and lay hold 
of it, under what is known as a tracing order . . . .”).  The wrongdoer bears the burden of 
proving that certain commingled value does not belong to the victim; interestingly, this 
permits a startling possibility in which the victim could claim all of the value in a 
commingled fund when the wrongdoer fails to meet the applicable burden.  See id. at § 
6.1(4), at 16 n.3 (citing Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 
(1916); Republic Supply Co. of Calif. v. Richfield Oil Co. of Calif., 79 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 
1935)).  This would seem to be an impermissible extraction of the claiming process 
within rules-based tracing.  See supra note 187 and accompanying text.  In any event, this 
scenario is not possible under the Securities Act, which caps the amount recoverable by a 
securityholder to the amount of the offering price and, in the case of section 11, the total 
award to the aggregate offering yield.  See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
193 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 215, at 869 cmt. c 
(“Although subsequent additions of cash from other sources increase the amount of the 
fund on which the claimant has a lien, they do not increase the amount he is entitled to 
receive from the fund.”).  See also 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 16 n.2 (“If the 
fund has grown by the deposit of unidentified funds, there seems no reason to give the 
plaintiff a proportionate share of the fund.”).  This is distinct from the situation where the 
value within the commingled fund appreciates.  See infra notes 199-200 and 
accompanying text. 
194 In re Diplock, 1 Ch. 465 (1948), is the first notable case in which courts applied 
this rule.  An alternate rule used within civil jurisdictions is known as “First In, First 
Out,” which deems the source of the first deposit into an active commingled account as 
the source of the first withdrawal.  See, e.g., Clayton’s Case, 1 Mer. 572 (1816).  Because 
of the difficulty associated with proving the source of the first deposit, some courts 
proceeded to deem the first withdrawal to be presumptively from the wrongdoer’s value, 
regardless of the order of deposits.  See, e.g., Hallet’s Case, 13 Ch.D. 696 (1879).  But 
see, e.g., GOFF & JONES, supra note 152, at 59. 
195 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, §§ 211, 212.  See also 
BIRKS, supra note 45, at 363 (“[T]he fund which is held by the defendant is regarded at 
the moment of the mixing as containing both the plaintiff’s money and his own and then 
as depreciating in the same proportions as it was originally constituted.”).  But see 1 
GEORGE PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 2.16, 2.17 (1978) (questioning the mechanics 
of pari passu when the withdrawals are untraceable). 
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Balance rule;196 because there are multiple possible sources of value,197 
the victim can claim only up to the lowest balance between the time of 
the wrongdoer’s deposit and tracing.198 
The difficult case involves a commingled bank account that has 
appreciated in value.  In this case the value may have increased through 
any number of ways, such as investment or interest.  Some contend that 
the victim should be entitled to no more than the traceable 
misappropriated value.199 Others instead advocate a pari passu approach, 
whereby the victim is entitled to claim a proportionate interest in the 
appreciated commingled value.200 
None of these rules, however, represents a principled approach to 
commingled funds as rules-based tracing does.  According to Dan 
Dobbs, “every one of the methods for tracing commingled funds can 
present a problem on some set of facts.”201 The problem is that these 
existing methods focus on assets or property in support of a legal claim.  
In contrast rules-based tracing focuses on value and does not include the 
analytically distinct exercise of claiming.202 Under this conception, “[a] 
mixed substitution creates a mixture of value.”203 Rules-based tracing 
merely seeks to determine whether commingled funds are a substitution, 
and thus a mixture, of value; this process “does not entail that the 
plaintiff has any rights in the traceable proceeds.”204 Commingling 
perforce involves fungible instruments, typically money within a bank 
account.  This fungibility is the linchpin of any situation where 
misappropriated value is substituted with value from the wrongdoer or 
some other party.  Certainly, fungibility does not entail substitution.  But 
whenever a wrongdoer commingles fungible instruments, they are either 
the original value that is the object of following or substituted value that 
 
196 See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612 (1st 
Cir. 1988); Re Mahan & Rowsey Inc., 817 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Bacno Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986). 
197 This includes not only value from the wrongdoer and the victim, but also from 
another victim or an innocent third party.  See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 201 (“[I]t is 
impossible to say whether or not [a deposit of value] cam from the plaintiff; the account 
is an indistinguishable mixture of value; but this impossibility is resolved in her favour 
[sic] against a wrongdoer.”). 
198 See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 22. 
199 See, e.g., BIRKS, supra note 45, at 366 (citing dicta within Re Hallet’s Estate, 13 
Ch.D. at 709, that “a fortiori that as against an innocent defendant the recipient can only 
say that there survives, in the appreciated asset, the full value of the enrichment originally 
received”).  Birks rightfully notes, however, that this position “seems inconsistent with 
the view expressed in relation to purchases from an unmixed fund,” where the victim is 
entitled to all of the wrongdoer’s proceeds.  Id. 
200 See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 16 n.2 (“[T]he plaintiff may have 
a plausible claim not only for a lien to secure his losses, but for a share of the augmented 
fund represented by the original ratio of his deposits to those of the defendant’s.”). 
201 Id. at § 6.1(4), at 25. 
202 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.  This is particularly appropriate 
within the securities context, where the justification for liability is based on the Securities 
Act and not the tracing requirement.  See infra Part III.A. 
203 SMITH, supra note 43, at 165. 
204 Id. at 166. 
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is the object of tracing.  Because portions of the following exercise are 
part of tracing,205 commingled funds are safely deemed traceable.  Rules-
based tracing, therefore, encounters no peculiar difficulties with 
commingled funds. 
 
INTRADISCIPLINARY TRACING 
The previous Parts have navigated through the technical terrain of 
securities and remedial law to map their respective conceptions of 
tracing.  Within each domain tracing has received particularized 
criticism.  Explicit comparison between these conceptions, however, 
allows remedial law to reveal the most serious problem with securities 
law’s conception of tracing:  it is not actually tracing.  Equally troubling, 
it is not even a form of following.  Securityholders must follow their 
purchase back to a fraudulent offering, and yet never seek specific 
restitution of these securities.  Moreover, because of the book-entry 
system, these securities are fungible, and thus substitutable, instruments 
ill-suited to following. 
Rules-based tracing can rehabilitate securities law’s tracing 
requirement.  The key is to abandon focus on the securities purchased, 
and instead trace the value exchanged, that is, the money.  This value is 
substituted via the wrongdoer’s commingled bank account.  And this 
value is the benefit that a wrongdoer unjustifiably receives at the 
securityholder’s expense.  Rules-based tracing also comports with the 
Securities Act in that the process directs securityholders to claim the 
statutory provision of monetary relief. 
Rules-based tracing handles multiple offerings with relative ease.  
This is accomplished by a simple designation system in which 
securityholders arbitrarily select an offering at the point of purchase.  For 
the purposes of asserting a claim, that selection will determine whether 
the securityholders exchanged value in connection with a fraudulent 
offering.  Designating offerings in this way will restore access private 
civil relief to all securityholders, and deter fraud optimally.  Further, this 
approach to tracing is not only compatible with the SEC’s “access equals 
delivery” model, but can further its objectives.  This Part’s 
intradisciplinary comparison thus yields a superior conceptual and 
practical framework for rules-based tracing within securities law. 
 
A. Re-Tracing 
Remedial tracing has no true counterpart within securities law.  The 
latter’s conception of tracing filters access to private civil relief under the 
Securities Act based on what “such security” a person has purchased.206 
This factual inquiry examines a security only to determine the link 
 
205 See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text. 
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between a securityholder and a fraudulent offering.207 To “trace” 
securities successfully means to conclude that an inferable relationship 
exists between the fraud and the ultimate purchase.208 
“Tracing” in securities law entails nothing more.  Proof of the causal 
link neither generates nor justifies any legal liability.209 The source of 
liability are sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act,210 and the 
justification comes from the Securities Act’s express purpose of adequate 
disclosure and implicit purpose of deterrence.211 Proof of the causal link 
does not even resolve the question of legal liability.  This is true even 
with respect to the strict liability provided under section 11 of the 
Securities Act, which requires proof not only of the fraud but also of the 
defendant’s direct role.212 
Put differently, the remedial counterpart to this securities doctrine 
would seem to be following.  The “tracing” requirement is simply a 
mechanical exercise in which courts reconstruct the path of a security 
from a public offering, through a centralized custodian, to a broker or 
dealer, and then into the hands of a purchaser.213 The security is but a 
proxy for the flow of misstatements or omissions within a public 
offering.214 Correspondingly, “tracing” here involves no real substitution 
of the security.215 On the contrary, to “trace” successfully requires proof 
that the security from the disputed public offering has not been 
substituted in any way;216 that is, the purchaser must perform the 
complete following exercise, which is “mutually inconsistent” with 
tracing.217 Indeed, the only actual substitution involves the requested 
relief; both sections 11 and 12(a)(2) do not award relief in the form of the 
 
207 See, e.g., In re:  Initial Public Offering Securities Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 
3857, 01 Civ. 8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL 
2297401, at *38 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004) (“Tracing may be established . . . through 
proof of a direct chain of title from the original offering to the ultimate owner . . . .”). 
208 See supra Part I.C.  This is entirely distinct from the presumption of reliance.  
See supra notes 78, 82, and accompanying text. 
209 Certainly, failure to establish the requisite causal link precludes access to private 
civil remedies under the Securities Act.  To understand tracing in this way, however, is to 
commit the mistake of seeing the requirement as one of standing.  See supra note 12 and 
accompanying text. 
210 See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 72-74, 85, and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 76. 
213 See supra notes 110, 187-188, and accompanying text. 
214 See supra Part I.C. 
215 When there is only one public offering, there is still “substitution” of the security 
in the limited sense that it is fungible with all other like securities via the book-entry 
system.  One, however, does not purchase a “specific” security in the aftermarket and 
thus one cannot know even the original thing that is “substituted” through a clearing 
corporation.  Moreover, this notion of substitution is merely one of form, and not of 
value, and thus not relevant for the purposes of tracing.  See SMITH, supra note 43, at 15; 
see also supra notes 174-181 and accompanying text. 
216See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C. 
217 See supra note 185. 
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security, but rather its offering price.218 Courts, therefore, require 
purchasers to “follow” securities, and yet “substitute” their claim. 
Securities law instead should trace the value exchanged and then 
substituted.  The existing method curiously takes the vantage point of the 
wrongdoer, and follows its direct connection to a security into the 
purchaser’s hands.219 This inverts and distorts the proper orientation that 
rules-based tracing takes, which is the value derived from 
misappropriation.220 In the context of securities this value is the purchase 
money.  Rather than focusing on the wrongdoer, this inquiry begins with 
the object of relief, the securityholder.  One need go no further than the 
Securities Act to see the primacy accorded to protecting the 
securityholder, and thus why it should be the initial vantage point.221 
And to the extent that courts follow anything, it should not be the 
security, but the money.  Beyond the fact that the statutory relief comes 
in the form of money,222 this is the misappropriated value that following 
should seek to locate and then restore.223 
But following the securityholder’s misappropriated value neither 
entails a substitution nor generates any liability.  Rules-based tracing is a 
process whereby courts determine whether certain substituted value 
within the wrongdoer’s possession is derivative of the victim’s original 
value, and thus is subject to a legal claim.224 The misappropriated value - 
the securityholder’s money - almost invariably ends up commingled in 
the wrongdoer’s bank account.225 In a semantic sense this money has 
changed into equity for the defendant.  In a more substantive sense the 
original value has merged with other value, either from other innocent 
parties or the wrongdoer, into a fungible mass available for separate 
 
218 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77k(g), 77l(2) (2004).  This is not to say that the 
substitution in relief is improper.  This, however, merely reinforces the fact that liability, 
and thus claiming, exclusively come from the Securities Act and its rationales. 
219 See supra notes 28-33, 127, and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 174, 185-187, and accompanying text. 
221 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.  This is compatible with a 
deterrence rationale for sections 11 and 12(a)(2), pursuant to which ex post awards to 
aggrieved securityholders are justified in their provision of ex ante protection to future 
securityholders.  See supra note 85.  The wrongdoer is relevant only to the extent that the 
relief provides incentives to prevent further claims by securityholders. 
222 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77l(2) (2004). 
223 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  Like following, however, rules-
based tracing does not generate liability, which is the subject of claiming.  See, e.g.,
SMITH, supra note 43, at 132. 
225 This could be any one of the many classes of defendants subject to section 11 or 
12(a)(2) liability.  Conceivably, such defendant might deposit the securityholder’s money 
into a separate account that experiences no other deposits or withdrawals.  This, however, 
would devolve into a following exercise.  If there are separate deposits or withdrawals, 
the same tracing principle would apply.  To the extent this does not comport literally with 
rules-based tracing, courts likely would not exalt form over substance.  See, e.g., Barnes’ 
Lessee v. Irwin, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 199, 203 (1793) (“The substance, and not the form, 
ought principally to be regarded.”). 
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transactions; this commingling perforce interchanges value, and thus 
involves a substitution that can only be traced.226 
And focusing on the substituted value supplies the particular form of 
relief provided by the Securities Act.  Misappropriating original value 
constitutes an unjustified benefit that a section 11 or 12(a)(2) defendant 
obtains at the securityholder’s expense; this is a paradigmatic case of 
unjust enrichment.227 Indeed, this is what sections 11 and 12(a)(2) 
contemplate by providing claims “either at law or in equity.”228 Further, 
the substituted value is the specific object of the securityholder’s claim.  
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) both award monetary relief based on, 
respectively, the “amount paid for the security,”229 and the “consideration 
paid for such security,”230 without requiring that this be the purchaser’s 
actual misappropriated value. 
Rules-based tracing of money represents a principled and justified 
way to restore access to private civil relief under the Securities Act.  The 
first step is to establish the transfer of the securityholder’s money to the 
defendant, as evidenced by a confirmation of sale or some other form of 
receipt.  The next step is to establish the merger or conversion of the 
securityholder’s money by the defendant with other value, as inferred 
from a deposit into a bank account containing value from either the 
wrongdoer or another party.231 Upon completing these steps, the 
securityholder can seek to invoke unjust enrichment as a basis for a claim 
under sections 11 or 12(a)(2). 
None of this guarantees that a securityholder will obtain relief.  
Beyond the admittedly lax requirements of the first two steps, a 
securityholder must satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment to have 
avail to a claim.  A court, therefore, must determine that there has been 
no breach of an independent duty and that the benefit to the defendant 
clearly exceeds the losses to the securityholder.232 Moreover, completing 
the rules-based tracing exercise only entitles a securityholder access to 
private civil relief.  A securityholder still must establish a prima facie 
case under section 11 or 12(a)(2).  For section 11 this involves proof of 
the defendant’s direct role in an offering and its fraudulent character.233 
For section 12(a)(2), in addition to the section 11 elements, there must be 
privity.234 Moreover, defendants certainly have an array of defenses.235 
226 Accordingly, even if one wanted to follow the original value, completing the 
exercise would be virtually impossible whenever a commingled bank account is involved. 
227 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
228 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(2) (2004). 
229 Section 11 provides a formula for deducting from this “amount paid,” with a cap 
based on the offering price.  See supra note 79.  Notably, one of the deductions involves 
“the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought.”  15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (emphasis 
added). 
230 Id. at § 77l(2). 
231 Additional value from the securityholder would require only a following 
exercise.  See supra note 225. 
232 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 1. 
233 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
235 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b), 77l(2). 
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B. Tracing Multiple Offerings 
Rules-based tracing of securities provides a significant benefit, 
however, that the existing requirement cannot.  The existence of the 
book-entry system and its centralized custodial structure effectively 
necessitates discrimination between various classes of securityholders.236 
Regardless of the method used, only Class I securityholders have any 
assurance of claiming private civil relief under the Securities Act.237 
Through inferential reasoning, this assurance extends to Class II, and 
arguably some Class III, securityholders when there is only one 
offering.238 This assurance evaporates, however, when there are multiple 
offerings; at best Class II securityholders have uncertain access to 
sections 11 and 12(a)(2), and at worst Class III securityholders have no 
access whatsoever.239 As a result, there is a considerable incentive to 
conduct multiple offerings to avoid substantial liability under the 
Securities Act. 
The way to combat this incentive is resort to intradisciplinary 
tracing.  One possibility is the Fungible Mass method derived from the 
toxic tort context.240 The method originated as a way to deal with the 
problem of indeterminate plaintiffs that cannot pinpoint the source of 
their injury.241 To solve this problem, courts have permitted the use of 
statistical evidence to establish that exposure to a particular substance 
was more probably the specific cause of the injury than other background 
factors.242 Adapted to the securities context, courts would apply a 
preponderance of the evidence standard to all securityholders.243 
Provided there is a greater than fifty percent probability that a given 
purchase was from an offering involving material misstatements or 
omissions,244 the total number of offerings involved would be irrelevant, 
and any securityholder could satisfy the existing tracing requirement.245 
236 See supra Parts I.B-C. 
237 See supra notes 31-32, 121, and accompanying text. 
238 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra Part I. C. 
240 See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text. 
241 See Sale, supra note 19, at 486 & n.361 (analyzing causation issues within In re 
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 833-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), 
and noting that the problem also plagues insider trading claims within securities law). 
242 See Sale, supra note 19, at 486-87 (“Many . . . courts have considered this 
problem in various toxic-substance contexts and have permitted proof of causation 
through statistically based evidence.”) (citing cases). 
243 See, e.g., Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1378-79 (D. Minn. 1984), 
aff’d, 760 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision). 
244 Cf. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 
(photo. reprint 1978) (9th ed. 1783) (quantifying reasonable doubt as tolerating a 10% 
error rate).  This implicates voluminous evidentiary literature concerning proof paradoxes 
and Bayesian formulations that cannot be addressed reasonably here.  See generally L. 
JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (Proof Paradoxes); Richard 
O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977) (Bayesian 
Formulation).  But see, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in 
Criminal Cases: Some Doubt about Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 126 (1999) 
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Hillary Sale has argued forcefully in favor of using this method 
instead of the prevailing Direct Tracing approach.246 The Fungible Mass 
method now enjoys sufficient currency within torts law that allays early 
judicial apprehension within securities law.247 Further, the method 
comports not only with sections 11 and 12(a)(2),248 but also the Securities 
Act’s express purpose.249 And, perhaps most significantly, the method 
provides Class II and III securityholders more assured access to private 
civil relief.250 
This access, however, would not always be available.  The Fungible 
Mass method requires statistical proof that a majority of the shares are 
from a fraudulent offering.  The method’s flip-side, then, is that 
securityholders would have no access to relief when a majority of the 
shares are from a non-fraudulent offering.251 Accordingly, the method 
still generates a perverse incentive.  Section 11 and 12(a)(2) defendants 
can use a non-fraudulent offering to eliminate or undo their liability for a 
previous fraudulent offering.252 Alternatively, one could preempt any 
risk of liability by splitting an originally planned offering into two 
offerings of equal amounts of securities, only one of which involves 
fraud.  The Fungible Mass method thus provides a solution to the tracing 
requirement, but suffers from the same current evasion strategy. 
Rules-based tracing can eliminate this problem.  All that would be 
necessary with multiple offerings is to give securityholders a choice.  At 
the point of purchase a securityholder would designate an offering to be 
connected with the value provided.  That designation would be recorded 
 
(“Our courts do not use jury instructions based on percentages of certainty, and I do not 
suggest here that they begin doing so.”). 
245 See Sale, supra note 19, at 488 (“[R]egardless of when they bought their shares, 
all of the shareholders would be Offering Shareholders and should have access to 
remedies of sections 11 and 12(a)(2).”). 
246 See id. at 483-93. 
247 See id. at 485 (“[A]cceptance of [statistically derived-proof] has gained 
ascendancy in all types of civil litigation and can be used for proof of traceability here.”).  
This development directly addresses a reason cited by a court that considered, and then 
rejected, the Fungible Mass method.  See In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 
381 (D. Mass 1987).  Sale’s proposal thus builds upon a method that courts already have 
recognized within the securities context.  I see no reason, however, why courts should be 
any more reluctant to embrace another intradisciplinary method that enjoys currency 
within the remedial context and is actually a theoretically correct conception of tracing. 
248 See Sale, supra note 19, at 489-93 (establishing the method’s compatibility with 
various restrictive aspects of both provisions, such as the one-year statute of limitations, 
liability caps, and strike suit guards). 
249 See id. at 493 (“[T]he use of statistics . . . would help to force defendants to take 
seriously their due-diligence responsibilities to deter misstatements and omissions-the 
reason Congress created such stringent provisions in sections 11 and 12(a)(2) in the first 
place.”). 
250 See id. at 488 (“ [S]tatistically derived proof solves the problem of shareholders 
who purchase Offering Shares in the Aftermarket and are, therefore, unable to meet the 
direct tracing requirement.”). 
251 See id. at 489 (“[A]ny time the percentage of later Offering Shares exceeds those 
in the earlier, disputed offering, the plaintiffs will not succeed with their statistically 
based evidence.”). 
252 See, e.g., supra note 36. 
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by the central depository or issuer, contemporaneous with the purchase.  
The total number of designations possible would be tied to the number of 
securities offered.  Akin to the rule courts currently apply,253 designations 
would operate on a “First-Come, First-In” basis; once all securities in a 
particular offering are designated, that option would disappear and the 
process would continue until all such designations of offerings were 
complete.254 Securityholders would be permitted only to trace, and then 
claim, value for designated offerings. 
Designations would present no logistical problems.  The electronic 
system currently in place for clearing and settling trades easily could 
handle recordation of designations.  Further, this task would be only a 
slight imposition for brokers or dealers that already must handle 
transactions.  Accordingly, the systemic and transaction costs of 
implementing this right-based tracing system would be minimal.  At the 
same time, the designations would provide clear evidence, and thus 
conserve judicial resources that the existing tracing inquiry does, or the 
Fungible Mass method would, expend.255 
Further, designations would present no legal difficulties.  The fact 
that securityholders necessarily must choose an offering without 
knowing ex ante which designation will lead to a claim is entirely 
consistent with sections 11 and 12(a)(2)’s bar on securityholders 
purchasing while knowing of fraud.256 And because the number of 
designations and securities offered are linked, the cap on damages to 
offering price would ensure that the maximum aggregate liability would 
comply with the statutory limit.257 
Moreover, the limit on designations effectively addresses any policy 
concerns about the accuracy of relief.  On the one hand the class of 
claimants may be overinclusive.  Certainly there will be some 
securityholders that will choose an offering actually unconnected with 
the exchanged value;258 and some securityholders will be able to make a 
claim even though they exchanged value in connection with a non-
fraudulent offering.259 On the other hand the class of claimants may be 
underinclusive.  There will be other securityholders that will not be able 
to choose the offering actually connected with their exchanged value; 
 
253 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
254 As with other methods, this designation scheme would be unnecessary when 
there is only one offering, as all those securities are already traceable.  See supra note 
130. 
255 Cf. Linda J. Candler, Tracing and Recovering Proceeds of Criminal Fraud 
Cases:  A Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Legislation, 31 INT’L LAW. 3, 4 (1997) (In 
numerous cases “tracing the assets and recovering the proceeds of the fraud have proved 
to be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.”) 
256 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(2) (2004). 
257 See id. at §§ 77k(e), 77l(2). 
258 Courts historically have viewed this concern as one of legal causation.  See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).  As demonstrated earlier, such a view is 
premised on a conception of tracing that is actually following.  See supra notes 213-218 
and accompanying text.  Rules-based tracing, however, is not concerned with the 
connection between misappropriated value and a fraudulent offering.  See supra notes 
219-223 and accompanying text. 
259 See Sale, supra note 19, at 489-91. 
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and some securityholders will not be able to make a claim even though 
they exchanged value in connection with a fraudulent offering.260 
While there is no guarantee that these different groups will be 
symmetrical, and thus offset each other,261 the amount of relief certainly 
will be accurate.  From the standpoint of a section 11 or 12(a)(2) 
defendant the limit on the number of designations ensures that the 
liability will not exceed the capped offering price.262 To the extent that 
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) seek to deter, rather than compensate,263 these 
designations would achieve a superior result than any of the existing 
methods.264 Indeed, these designations theoretically should produce the 
optimal amount of desired deterrence contemplated by statute. 
At the same time, the designations employ an egalitarian approach to 
all classes of securityholders.  Unlike existing approaches that follow 
securities, the designation system is based on the value exchanged.  This 
is manifest in how securityholders would select an offering at the time of 
purchase, which is when an exchange of value occurs.  Class I 
securityholders effectively will experience no difference under this 
scheme, as they will have the first opportunity to make a designation.  
And unless Class I securityholders purchase the entire offering, Class II 
and III securityholders also will have an opportunity to make a 
designation.  This is because the capacity to designate, and thus seek a 
claim, would turn on not a securityholder’s access, but the relationship 
between the value exchanged and the number of securities offered.265 
Rules-based tracing thus eschews the need to make “arbitrary 
 
260 Securityholders can avoid this result by simply purchasing at least two shares and 
hedging their designations on different offerings.  A modest consequence of such rational 
hedging might be that shares from different offerings will trade at different prices, 
particularly in response to one offering being barred by the statute of limitations and in 
situations where the company has a less than pristine reputation.  A more cynical 
consequence might be the emergence of a secondary post-purchase market in which 
securityholders trade their designations about which offerings might involve material 
misstatements or omissions.  I thank Tung Yin for raising these points. 
Both possible consequences present the same basic problem of variances between 
different designated shares, either for the same company or between separate companies.  
As a preliminary matter, these variances can be accounted for and justified by the 
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.  See supra note __.  Moreover, the market would 
be limited by the one-year statute of limitations running from the post-effective date.  
And, in any event, these secondary claims likely would not generate any additional 
liability; because the designation scheme eliminates any uncertainty in claiming, any 
securityholder that had designated a fraudulent offering likely would assert a claim.  
Finally, as the aggregate recovery cap limits the number of permissible claims, courts 
simply could look at the records for securityholders that had made initial designations 
and prefer their claims. 
261 But cf. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 46, § 1 cmt. d (“Ordinarily the 
benefit to the one and the loss to the other are co-extensive, and the result . . . [will be] to 
make restitution to the other for the loss which he has suffered.”). 
262 See id. at §§ 77k(e), 77l(2). 
263 See supra 85. 
264 As Sale has noted, “[t]he most important argument . . . is that without a new way 
to prove tracing, the mechanism to enforce the recovery rights of [Class II and III 
securityholders] is eliminated.”  Sale, supra note 19, at 491. 
265 See supra note 253. 
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distinctions” between securityholders.266 Instead, the market for 
purchasing securities would govern the capacity to seek private civil 
relief under the Securities Act. 
 
C. Value Equals Access Equals Delivery 
The SEC’s “access equals delivery” model is remarkably compatible 
with the rules-based tracing scheme proposed here.  The model strives to 
streamline the procedures for effecting delivery of a final prospectus 
without compromising investor confidence about their participation in a 
registered offering.267 The additional notification provision cuts against 
this objective.  The provision effectively requires delivery of a notice by 
a “well-known seasoned issuer” in lieu of the final prospectus delivery 
requirement that the model seeks to relax. 
To be sure, this notification requirement is necessary to protect 
investors.  Notice performs a valuable function in confirming that a 
purchase was part of a registered transaction.  This reassures investors of 
their access to certain private civil remedies in the event that the offering 
turns out to be fraudulent.268 Whether deliberate or not, however, the 
SEC no longer explicitly bases the need for notice on “an investor’s 
ability to trace securities.”269 Certainly this ability has deteriorated at the 
hands of the book-entry system and judicial formulations of the “tracing” 
requirement.270 As a result, while delivery of a final prospectus can be 
effected through online access, securityholders no longer have reliable 
access to private civil remedies under the Securities Act. 
Rules-based tracing would obviate the need for a notification 
requirement.  Tellingly, the notification requirement does not revolve 
around the path of the security, but rather the transactional status of the 
purchase, that is, the exchange of value.271 Similarly, designating an 
offering at the point of purchase enables securityholders to later trace the 
exchange, and subsequent substitution, of misappropriated value.  This 
scheme thus would reassure all initial participants in a “well-known 
seasoned issuer’s” offering that they will be capable of seeking relief 
through sections 11 or 12(a)(2).272 Such reassurance is what the 
notification requirement presumably seeks to provide. 
 
266 In re:  Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., Nos. 21 MC 92, 01 Civ. 3857, 01 Civ. 
8408, 01 Civ. 7048, 01 Civ. 9417, 01 Civ. 6001, 01 Civ. 0242, 2004 WL 2297401, at *37 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004). 
267 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
268 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
269 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
270 See supra Parts II.B-C.  Under the “access equals delivery” model 
securityholders still would receive a confirmation of sale and subsequently could request 
a copy of the final prospectus.  See Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67439.  
Because issuers eligible for the “access equals delivery” model must be relatively 
established and reliable, see id., there is a limited need for reassurance that rules-based 
tracing can satisfy.  For other issuers rules-based tracing would not supplant existing final 
prospectus and notification requirements. 
271 See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 254-264 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Tracing is a method that appears within multiple fields of law.  
Courts frequently trace in agency,273 antitrust,274 bankruptcy,275 
commercial,276 contract,277 criminal,278 elderly,279 family,280 property,281 
tax,282 and tort283 matters.  These applications are matched perhaps only 
 
273 See, e.g., MARK HAPGOOD, PAGET’S LAW OF BANKING 372 (11th ed. 1996) (“A 
fundamental condition for property to be traced in equity is the existence of an equitable 
relationship.”).  But cf. supra note 152. 
274 See, e.g., Amy A. Marasco, Note, Tracing an Antitrust Injury in Secondary Line 
Price Discrimination Cases, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 926-27 (1982) (“[C]ourts have 
taken a stricter approach to the concept of tracing and have allowed damages only when 
it has been clear that the injury did not result from any form of legitimate competition or 
the plaintiff’s own inadequacies.”). 
275 See, e.g., Steve H. Nickels & Edward S. Adams, Tracing Proceeds to Attorneys’ 
Pockets (and the Dilemma of Paying for Bankruptcy), 78 MINN. L. REV. 1079, 1104-05 
(1994) (“When the debtor commingles proceeds with non-proceeds, courts employ a 
fictional tracing method known as the lowest intermediate balance rule, derived from the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts.”). 
276 See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, Tracing Commingled Proceeds:  The 
Metamorphosis of Equity Principles into U.C.C. Doctrine, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 282 
(1990) (“In creating [a] principle of attribution, the drafters of [U.C.C.] section 9-306 . . . 
borrowed tracing rules from the laws of trusts, equity and restitution and infused Article 
Nine with them.”). 
277 See, e.g., Matthews v. Crowder, 69 S.W. 779, 780 (Tenn. 1902) (“[T]he 
supplementary subjection . . . results from . . . the doctrine that a cestui que trust may 
follow the trust fund wherever he may be able to trace it, except in the hands of innocent 
third persons.”). 
278 See, e.g., Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133, 136 (N.Y. 1877) (“[T]he owner of 
negotiable securities stolen and afterwards sold by the thief may pursue the proceeds of 
the sale in the hands of the felonious taker or his assignee with notice, through whatever 
changes the proceeds may have gone, so long as the proceeds or the substitute therefor 
[sic] can be distinguished and identified . . . .”). 
279 See, e.g., Janel C. Frank, Note, How Far Is Too Far?  Tracing Assets in Medicaid 
Estate Recovery, 79 N.D. L. REV. 111, 144 (2003) (“Most states have interpreted [the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act] as allowing them to trace and recover assets that 
were once owned by the recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse.”). 
280 See, e.g., J. Thomas Oldman, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 
FAM. L.Q. 219, 223-24 (1989) (“[T]o establish a separate property claim to funds in 
existence at the time of divorce, a spouse must be able to trace such funds to separate 
property.”). 
281 See, e.g., ANDREW P. BELL, MODERN LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN ENGLAND 
AND IRELAND 462 (1989) (“The law of tracing embraces . . . rules relating to the situation 
where the subject-matter of an interest has been disposed of or undergone some change of 
form or mixing with other property.”). 
282 See, e.g., Alfred D. Youngwood & Christina M. Cerrito, Tracing Property After 
Its “Owner” Changes:  Sections 337, 704(c)(1), 737, 751, 382, 384, 1031, and 1374, 51 
TAX LAW. 511, 512 (1998) (“Congress has chosen to track the property movements in 
certain of these business arrangements . . . to prevent income or basis shifting among 
parties who might have the incentives and ability to do so.”). 
283 See, e.g., James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, Or, Where There’s a Remedy, 
There’s a Right:  A Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYR. L. REV. 215, 245 n.230 (2004) 
(“Nineteenth century equity courts developed presumptions that permitted tracing of 
monies that had been illegally deposited in the tortfeasor’s bank account and commingled 
with other funds.”) (citing cases). 
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by the multiplicity of names tracing has assumed over the years.284 More 
significantly, an absence of dialogue between legal domains has spawned 
different conceptions of tracing within securities and remedial law that 
engender radically divergent results.  In securities law tracing deprives 
securityholders of private civil relief, whereas in remedial law, tracing 
provides restitutionary relief to victims deprived of their value. 
Undoubtedly, these inverted conceptions of tracing are the product of 
unconscious accident, and not premeditated design.  As one commentator 
has observed, 
Were symmetrical categories and doctrines joined, 
courts would have no trouble spotting their intra-
connection; it is only when the Siamese-doctrines are 
severed that they may wander off in different 
directions.285 
The principal difficulty, however, lies not in spotting these “intra-
connections,” but rather in convincing the law to use them.  Centuries of 
remedial tracing jurisprudence stand ready for courts to reconsider the 
securities tracing requirement.  All courts need to do is acknowledge the 
value of money. 
 
284 See supra notes 165-169 and accompanying text. 
285 Hirsch, supra 66, at 1154. 
